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ABSTRACT
This dissertation studies three aspects of international economics and their effects
on the internal economy.
The first chapter studies the effects of road and port infrastructure on interna-
tional market access of different regions within a country, precisely in the context of
India. I first show that comparable firms don’t use the same port to reach the same
destination, and that even on average, the port chosen by firms is not necessarily the
closest. To quantify the welfare gains of improving ports or roads, I build a model of
port choice that takes into account differential costs of reaching the port on different
road types, and differences in port productivity. I embed this model in a general
equilibrium model of intra- and inter-national trade across Indian districts and for-
eign countries and estimate that improving ports seems to have a larger aggregate
effect on overall welfare than improving roads, but the effects are heterogenous across
regions. Coastal districts benefit more from port improvements, while inland regions
tend to benefit more from road improvements. Hence while the aggregate impact of
port improvement is larger, there is scope for road investment to address unequal
regional gains.
The second chapter studies the connection between international trade and inter-
national migration. I start from the observation that migration patterns potentially
influence market access in two ways. First, as migrants relocate, overall demand for
goods and services moves closer to the regions of immigration. Second, migrants act
ix
as trade facilitators as they keep ties with their home countries. I estimate the causal
impact of migrant on exports from the United States, and study the two mechanisms
in a model of intra- and inter-national trade and migration. I simulate what would
happen if the migrant share of the US fell back to 1980s level. US export trade
costs would increase by 3.5% on average, and welfare would decrease by an average
of 0.13%, with substantial variation across states. States who currently sell a larger
portion of their output to migrants living in the US would suffer more as their cus-
tomers move away, and states with higher export exposure would also suffer more
from the rise in export costs.
The third chapter, co-authored with Andrei Levchenko and Raphael Auer, studies
the impact of a hypothetical revocation of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA). We build a multi-sector, multi-country trade model and simulate
an increase of tariffs between NAFTA countries and use the sectoral heterogeneity
across US congressional districts combined with sectoral-level wage changes from the
model to assess the district-level impact of the revocation of NAFTA. We then cor-
relate the model implied changes with electoral outcomes to study whether districts
that supported President Trump in the 2016 election stand to lose or gain from the
revocation of NAFTA. We find that almost all districts lose in terms of real wage,
and districts who voted more in favour of Trump actually tend to lose relatively more
from NAFTA revocation. Losing districts tend to be more integrated in the world
economy, not only because they suffer from a large import competition from abroad,
but also because they export a large part of their output and use imported inputs.
The results underscore the difficulty of making simple heuristic judgements about
who gains and loses from trade policy changes in the global economy.
x
CHAPTER I
The Impact of Port and Road Infrastructure on
International Market Access and Regional Inequality
1.1 Introduction
International trade relies on a network of infrastructures. Ports are at the center
of this network, as around 80% of the world’s trade in goods is seaborn (UNCTAD,
2018). Accordingly, port quality and easy access to ports are essential to participation
in the global economy and investments in ports and port connectivity are large.1
This paper seeks to address the following question: which part of the infrastructure
network is the bottleneck?
I provide a framework to estimate the productivity of different ports and the rel-
ative importance of port infrastructure versus road infrastructure in shaping inter-
national market access and regional inequality. I build a simple model of port choice
based on two key stylized facts derived from novel data on firm-port-destination data
from India. First, while a given firm tends to use a unique port to reach a given des-
tination, comparable firms in the same location and same sector use different ports
to export to the same destination country. Second, the modal port within the same
origin-sector-destination is not necessarily the closest port to the location, nor the
closest to the destination. To build a model that rationalizes these facts, I assume
1For example, India’s Sagarmala Project plans investments of over 15 billion USD for port modernization, and 30
billion USD for port connectivity between 2015 and 2035.
1
that firms have an idiosyncratic productivity shock for different port-routes. I also
decompose the export cost into the cost of going to the port, a port specific produc-
tivity, and a cost of going from the port to the destination. A large port productivity
induces firms to use a port that might require a longer route to the port.
Under a convenient assumption about the distribution of idiosyncratic route pro-
ductivities, the model allows me to identify port quality differentials by observing
firms’ port choices. The estimation regresses port shares within an origin-destination
pair on port fixed effects, after controlling for the origin-port cost and the port-
destination cost. In this estimation, a key parameter governs the heterogeneity in
idiosyncratic productivities and translates into a port-choice cost elasticity. I show
how to estimate that parameter, and along the way I estimate parameters governing
the costs of traveling to the port on different road types. I then incorporate the port
choice model into a multi-region, multi-country model of intra- and inter-national
trade and use it to conduct counterfactuals where roads and ports are separately
improved to assess which component of the infrastructure network is the most im-
portant.
I apply my framework to India using a novel dataset of firm-level export trans-
actions combined with various road and port data. I find that the port elasticity
is around 15% higher than the trade elasticity. Using a trade elasticity of 5, this
means that when the cost of using port increases by 1%, its share of use decreases by
5.7%. My estimates imply that quality varies significantly across Indian ports: the
average port’s iceberg trade cost is around 26 percentage points higher than the best
port (weighted by value). My port quality estimates correlate well with observable
measures of port productivity. I also estimate the cost of traveling to the port on
a normal road and on an expressway and find that 100 kilometers (60 miles) on a
2
normal road is equivalent to an ad-valorem trade cost of around 7.4%, while the same
distance on an expressway is equivalent to an ad-valorem cost of 5.9%. According
to my estimates, a firm is indifferent between shipping through the average port and
driving an additional 350 km (215 miles) to ship through the best port.
I then construct a model of trade between Indian districts and foreign countries,
where internal trade uses the road network, and international trade uses both the
road and port infrastructures. Using the model, I estimate that bringing all ports to
the best level increase real wages by close to 6% on average, with large heterogeneity
across districts and a standard deviation of 5.3%. Inland districts gain less than
coastal regions. Improving port access across regions by bringing all roads to the
port to the same quality (while keeping internal costs constant) has a lower impact,
with an increase in average real wages of 0.27%. In this case, inland regions with
lower connectivity to the coast benefit more. When internal trade cost also improve
with the road improvements, average wages increase by 2.3%. These results imply
that port improvements have a larger potential than road improvements to increase
overall welfare.
I provide an estimate of the cost of improving all ports and improving all roads
and show that the costs are of similar magnitude. I use data on investment in ports
completed between 2015 and 2019 and changes in port shares to estimate that an
additional billion dollar spent on port improvements reduces the iceberg trade cost
at the port by around 6.5%. A placebo test using investments under completion and
future investments shows that my estimates are not driven by correlation between
investment targets and anticipated port growth. I approximate the cost of bringing
all ports to the best level by multiplying the estimated marginal effect by the total
improvements required to improve all ports. I also estimate the total cost of improv-
3
ing all roads by using data on cost per kilometer of highway improvement. These
back of the envelope calculations indicate that improving all ports to the best level
and improving all roads to the best level have a similar cost despite their relatively
different welfare implications.
While the aggregate welfare impact of port infrastructure improvement seems
larger than those of road infrastructure improvement for a comparable cost, their
distributional impacts vary across regions. Hence policymakers might still be inter-
ested in using road improvements or a combination of road and port improvements
if they have specific regions to target in mind. Improving specific ports can also pro-
vide a tool to address distributional concerns; I compute the bottleneck port for each
Indian district, defined as the port which results in the highest gain in district-level
welfare for an equal port-level improvement.
I contribute to the existing literature in several dimensions. First, while previous
literature has mostly focused on each type of infrastructure separately, I adopt a more
integrated view of infrastructures. Previous papers have highlighted the importance
of road infrastructure (Asturias et al., 2019; Faber, 2014; Alder, 2019; Baldomero-
Quintana, 2020), rail network (Donaldson, 2018) or ports (Ducruet et al., 2020;
Ganapati et al., 2020) separately. A branch of the literature also studies how internal
trade costs affects international trade and regional distributional impacts of trade
liberalization (Atkin and Donaldson, 2015; Sotelo, 2020; Fajgelbaum and Redding,
2018). I contribute to this literature by giving a more prominent place to ports,
which act as connecting points between internal and external trade costs. My paper
is also related to the literature on optimal infrastructure investment, which has also
focused on a single type of infrastructure (Fajgelbaum and Schaal, 2020; Santamaria,
2020). In this paper, I explicitly model road and port infrastructure, which allows
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me to assess which type of infrastructure is the bottleneck. A related paper is Van
Leemput (2021), who estimates the gains from reducing internal and external trade
costs in India. In the current paper, I specifically study the internal and external
trade costs associated with infrastructure.
Second, I contribute to the growing literature on infrastructure and shipping net-
works that uses heterogeneous shipping costs for analytical convenience (Allen and
Arkolakis, 2020; Ganapati et al., 2020). I provide stylized facts based on micro-data
that justify the assumption of heterogenous shipping costs, and a novel estimate of
the parameter estimating the shipping cost heterogeneity, based on firm-level data
that can be useful in other settings. My framework is closely related to Allen and
Arkolakis (2019), who estimate a related parameter, which is the elasticity of high-
way segment usage to the segment cost.2 My estimation is grounded in disaggregated
firm-level data, and applies more specifically to port choice. Thus my estimate is
more suited for the the emerging literature on ports (Ducruet et al., 2020; Ganapati
et al., 2020). The route choice model in Ganapati et al. (2020) is also closely re-
lated. In their model, producers in each potential sourcing location draw a random
trade cost to other destinations for each variety of a continuum of goods, and offer a
perfectly competitive price. Consumers then choose the least cost supplier for each
variety in a similar fashion as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). In that framework, the
parameter governing the route elasticity has the interpretation of a trade elasticity,
while in my framework the trade elasticity and the port elasticity are allowed to
differ. My estimate lends some support for their approach. While my estimate of
the port-route elasticity is statistically significantly higher than the trade elasticity,
it is close to it and inside the conventional range of trade elasticities.
2In a revision, Allen and Arkolakis (2020), the framework is modified and the elasticity is the trade elasticity.
The original estimate is still used in other papers such as Ducruet et al. (2020) or Baldomero-Quintana (2020).
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Finally, my paper provides a novel way of measuring port productivities and new
estimates of road costs differential between expressways and normal roads. Blonigen
and Wilson (2008) uses data on import charges to estimate port productivities. My
framework only requires data on port shares, which is more commonly accessible
through customs dataset than data on import or export charges. I also estimate the
relative cost of distance on an expressway relative to normal roads which could be
useful in the calibration in other research. As a contrast, other papers use theoretical
relative speeds to infer the relative costs on expressways and normal roads (Asturias
et al., 2019; Alder, 2019).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the
data and stylized facts about port usage in India, section 1.3 builds the model of
port choice, section 1.4 shows how to estimate the key parameters and port quality,
section 1.5 shows the estimation results, section 1.6 builds the full model, and section
1.7 presents the results of the counterfactuals.
1.2 Basic facts
1.2.1 Data
The main data I use is a dataset of firm-level export transactions from India. The
dataset covers a sample of around 16,300 firms. I observe every export transaction
the firm makes between 2015 and 2019. For each transaction, I observe the value of
the transaction, the port of exit and the destination port, which I use to infer the
destination country. I also observe the list of a firm’s branches with their address
and merge the data with India’s company register and Economics Census’ list of
establishments to obtain the firms’ sectoral classification. For my purposes, I drop
exports by air or land. In 2019, these constituted less than 5% of exports in terms
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of weight, and around 24% in terms of value.3 I keep all ports used by at least 10
firms in my sample. The resulting sample covers 16,300 firms located in over 400
different Indian districts, 22 ports and over two hundred destinations. The 22 ports
cover over 99% of Indian sea exports. The sample covers slightly less than 30% of
India’s total exports. Appendix A.1 shows that the sample is representative of the
official aggregate figures for key statistics such as port and destination shares, and
contains the details of the data construction.
1.2.2 Stylized facts
In this section, I show two stylised facts about port usage that are useful ingredi-
ents for modelling port choice.
Heterogeneity in port choice First, I show that single firms tend to use only one
port to reach a given destination. The left panel of Figure 1.1 shows the histogram
of the number of port used within a firm-destination pair level. Close to 90% of firms
use a unique port to reach a given destination.
I then look at how homogeneous the port choices are among comparable firms. To
that end, I compute the number of different ports used by firms in the same sector
and same origin region, to export to a same destination. I define a sector as an
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) 5-digit group, an origin region
as an Indian district, and a destination as a country.4 To classify each transaction
to an origin district for firms that have many branches, I assume that the good was
shipped from the branch closest to the observed port. This might introduce some
3Given India’s border geography, the share of land exports is extremely low at 2.4% in value and 1.5% in weight.
Exports by air are the main alternative to sea and account for around 21% of total exports in value and 1.5% in weight.
Some transactions take place through inland port, used to transit towards actual ports. For these observations, I use
the actual sea port of exit.
4An example of ISIC5 category is 17111 which corresponds to “Preparation and spinning of cotton fiber including
blended cotton”. Appendix A.2 explores narrower geographical classifications and shows that the patterns remain
the same when using a postal code as an origin region, and discharge ports as destinations.
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Notes: The left panel displays the histogram of the number of ports per firm-destination pair. The right
panel displays the histogram of the number of ports per origin-sector-destination triplet. Only triplets
with more than one firm are kept to avoid triplets where the number of ports is 1 simply due to small
sample.
spurious heterogeneity in case of misclassification, and I repeat the same exercise
using firms that only have one branch in Appendix A.2 with similar findings. The
right panel of Figure 1.1 displays the histogram of the number of ports by sector-
district-destination triplet. If all firms in the triplet were using the same port, the
distribution would be a mass point at 1. However, it turns out that while the mode
is a single port per triplet, more than one port is used in most cases. This indicates
that firms have unobservable affinities for particular ports beyond their location,
sectoral classification or destinations.
Closest port If some ports are better than others, firms might be willing to incur
additional internal costs to reach a better port, even on average. In that case, the
modal port in each triplet might not be the closest one available. Table 1.1 shows
that indeed, the closest port to the origin is on average 17% closer to the origin
than the modal port chosen by firms within a triplet, where the distance is the road
distance. The modal port is also further away from the destination than the Indian
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Table 1.1: Modal port distances
origin-port distance port-destination distance
modal port closest port modal port closest port
Average 233 194 5,565 4,921
Median 93 81 5,337 4,299
Notes: This table shows the average and median road distance in kilometers between the origin district and three
ports: the modal port within an origin-sector-destination triplet, the port closest to the origin (by road), and the
port closest to the destination (by sea). The average and median are computed over triplets, weighted by number of
transactions.
port closest to the destination by 11%, where the distance is the sea-distance. This
implies that even on average, firms seem to either strike a balance between a port
closer to their location, or a port closer to the destination, or they might simply
chose to incur additional internal cost to reach a more productive port.
1.3 A model of port choice
In this section, I present a simple partial-equilibrium model of port choice that
rationalizes the facts presented above. I will incorporate that model in a full general
equilibrium later in section 1.6. For expositional purposes, I remove any sectoral
dimension in this section, and add it later when moving to the data.
A firm i located in origin region o, faces the following iceberg trade cost to export




were τoρ captures the cost of going from the origin region to the port, τρ captures the
cost of handling the shipment at the port, and τρd captures the cost of bringing the
shipment from the port to the destination. εioρd is a firm specific route (o − ρ − d)
productivity shifter that rationalizes the fact that different firms within the same
sector-origin-destination use different ports. Differences in τρ also explain why firms
9
might not chose the closest port, even absent of firm heterogeneity.
I assume that the productivity shifter is Fréchet distributed, with the following
cumulative distribution function:





where θ is a shape parameter that governs the dispersion of ε. High values of θ imply
a low dispersion.
The firm chooses the port ρ∗ that minimizes the export cost, so the effective esport
cost for firm i is given by τiod = minρ
τoρτρτρd
εiρd
. Using the properties of the Fréchet






so that θ can also be interpreted as the port elasticity. For large values of θ (corre-
sponding to small heterogeneity in idiosyncratic productivities), the share of firms
that react to a change in the port-specific cost is larger because the draw of ε is more
concentrated and more firms’ optimal choice changes.
The expected export cost between o and d is given by:















where κ is a constant involving the Gamma function and θ. Notice that the expected
trade cost depends on the same term Φod =
∑
ρ (τoρτρτρd)
−θ as the denominator of
the share equation (1.2), with an exponent of 1/θ. I will use this fact below to
estimate the parameter θ.
Equation (1.2) makes it apparent how the port (inverse) quality τρ is related to
the observable left-hand side share. With an estimate of θ and controlling for the
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costs from the origin to the port, and from the port to the destination, one can
recover an estimate of τρ. The value of θ is key in that estimation: a large θ implies
that small deviations in port quality lead to high changes in shares, while a low θ
leads to muted changes. Similarly, equation (1.3) shows that θ also governs how the
expected trade cost depends on the range of port costs. A large θ implies smaller
heterogeneity, so that all firms use the same port and the expected cost is close to the
smallest (τoρτρτρd). Finally, it is clear that export costs depend on the cost along the
two “domestic” main segments of the route and their corresponding infrastructure:
road quality affects τoρ and port quality affects τρ.
The model is related to Allen and Arkolakis (2019), with the following departure.
That paper introduces an intermediary trader who incurs an idiosyncratic trade cost
shifter along different routes and assume that firms match randomly with the traders.
I instead assume that the route productivity shifter is firm specific, which fits the
firm-level stylised fact showed in Section 1.2 better, and can be incorporated in a
standard trade model with firm heterogeneity as shown below in Section 1.6. It is
also related to the framework of Ganapati et al. (2020) and Allen and Arkolakis
(2020). There, the producers in an origin location draw a random trade cost to
other destinations for each good in a continuum of varieties, and offer a perfectly
competitive price. Consumers then choose the least cost supplier for each variety in
a similar fashion as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). In that framework, the dispersion
parameter θ has the interpretation of a trade elasticity. In the present paper, the




In this section, I show how to identify θ under standard assumptions in the trade
literature, and how to recover estimates of infrastructure quality.
1.4.1 Port elasticity
To estimate θ, I make two additional assumptions on pricing and demand, and
show how to combine export value data with port shares to estimate θ.
The first assumption is that firms set constant markup prices. The price that firm
i in origin o would charge to destination d if it sent through the port ρ is given by:





where µ is the markup and ci is the firm’s marginal cost. This assumption is consis-
tent with a variety of common market structures, including perfect competition and
monopolistic competition. I still allow for firm-level heterogenous marginal cost ci.
The second assumption I make is that the demand satisfies constant elasticity of
substitution, so the spending on each firm’s output in destination d is given by:




where σ is the elasticity of substitution in demand, Xd is total spending at destination
d and Pd is the price index. Under assumptions (1.4) and (1.5), the total exports of





To eliminate µ and ci, it will be convenient to work with the ratio of a same firm’s















To further remove the destination pair specific term, take the same ratio with















Using the fact that the Fréchet draws are independent across destinations and firms,
one can show that the expectation of this ratio conditional on observing the firms



































where Γ is the gamma function and the expectation is taken over all firm pairs
in origin o and o′ exporting to the same destination pair (d, δ). Notice that the
summation terms inside the parenthesis are equal to the multilateral resistance term
Φod on the denominator of the port share equation. As a consequence, the previous




























which provides a useful moment condition to estimate the ratio 1−σ
θ
. That estimating
strategy uses the fact that the expected trade cost is a function of the multilateral
resistance term Φod to the power of 1/θ.
Two elements of the moment condition (1.7) work together to estimate the ratio
1−σ
θ
. The first part is the product of the Gamma functions Γ (1 + x)2 Γ (1− x)2,
which is equal to 1 at x = 0 and is strictly increasing until x = 1 where it tends to
infinity. The second part is the ratio of port shares that controls for average trade
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costs. Absent of any heterogeneity across firms, the ratio of values on the left-hand
side would be completely captured by the ratio of the trade costs, and the first part
would tend to 1, consistent with x = 0 and θ =∞ (remember that a high θ implies
low dispersion in the Fréchet draws). As the Fréchet draws become more disperse,
the expectation of the value ratio increases, which implies a higher x and lower θ.
Note that until this point, the specific multiplicative form of the cost τoρd hasn’t
been used. I use it now to link the moment condition to the data. The value I
observe is freight-on-board (FOB), which means that it only includes the cost up to
the port, but not the cost of transportation from the port to the final destination.
Hence the observed value is X∗ioρd = τ
−1
ρd Xiod. As a result, when going to the data, I
take the ratios conditioning on the two firms using the same port pair to reach the


















Note that conditioning on a particular observed port pairs (ρ, ρ′) has no impact on
the expectation, since the observed port pairs are the optimal ones.
For exposition purposes, I dropped the sectoral component in the notation. When
moving to the data, I will also allow for different trade costs by sector, by simply
computing the port shares at the origin-sector-destination pair level, and the sales
ratio restricting to firms in the same sector.
1.4.2 Infrastructure quality
As mentioned above, the share of firms within an origin-destination pair using a
given port is informative on the underlying trade cost and specific port quality. As
a reminder, taking logs of the equation of port shares (1.2) gives:
ln πoρd = −θ ln τoρ − θ ln τρ − θ ln τρd − ln Φod
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While the previous section focused on estimating θ and didn’t need to identify τρ
for that purpose, I now show how to recover estimates of τρ given an estimate of θ.
The strategy is to parametrize τoρ and τρd and estimate ln τρ using a port fixed
effect. Specifically, the cost between o and ρ is the product of the cost over each











The exponential form is has the convenient property that the iceberg cost tends to
1 as the time spent on the segment tends to 0. Splitting a segment in two parts also
doesn’t affect the cost, because the product of the two subsegment iceberg trade costs
will equal the the iceberg cost of the main segment and only depend on the total
time spent on the segment. To link the time with observable road infrastructure, I
assume that the time on segment k depends on the types of road of the segment:
timek = β̃
c(k)distk,(1.11)
where c(k) is the road category of segment k and distk is the distance travelled on
the segment. In practice, c will be either a normal road (typically with two lanes
in total, and no separation), or an expressway separated in the middle (typically
with two lanes per direction). The parameter β̃c captures the (inverse) average
speed on a particular type of road. This parametrization will allow me to easily run
counterfactual such as replacing a given segment of infrastructure from normal road
to expressway.
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I also parametrize the cost between the port and the destination as the sea distance
between the port and destination:
ln τρd = λ ln seadistρd + uρd.







sea ln seadistρd + αρ︸︷︷︸
−θτρ
+Φod + uoρd,
where distcoρ is the total distance travelled on roads of type c, to go from o to ρ
on the least-cost route. Because the least-cost route is itself a function of unknown












− βsea ln seadistρd − αρ − Φod
]2
,
where Roρ is the set of routes on the road network that go from origin o to port ρ.
A necessary condition for the vector β∗ = {β∗c} to be a solution to this problem is
that:











∗) is the total length on category c in the solution of the least cost
route given β∗. In other words, regressing the port shares on the distances computed
conditional on β∗ and other covariates needs to result in the same vector β∗, so
that β∗ is a fixed point to the mapping defined by the argmin function in (1.13).
Note that given βc, the least-cost route problem is well defined and easily solved
using standard routing optimization algorithms. Hence one can solve the fixed-point
problem in (1.13) using the following steps:
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1. Guess {βc},
2. Solve for the optimal route for all oρ pairs given βc,
3. Solve for {βc}, βsea, {αρ}, {Φod} given distcoρ by Poisson pseudo-maximum like-
lihood estimation,
4. Go back to step 1 with the new value of {βc}.
In practice, I use the Dijkstra algorithm to solve for the least cost route. I use some
initial values for βc (for example based on the maximal speeds on each type of road),
and the algorithm only takes few iterations to converge because the optimal route
using my initial guess is very close to the one using the final βc.
Being a solution to the fixed point problem (1.13) is only a necessary condition to
being a solution to the minimization problem (1.12), unless the fixed point is unique.
While I am not able to prove this, I check that the solution is unique by starting
from different initial guesses, and all converge to the same point.5
The advantage of this estimation procedure is that is provides an estimate of port
quality (τρ) and the effect of different road types on trade costs (β
c) from the same
estimating procedure, up to a common scale equal to θ. Estimating the βcs directly
instead of relying on preset values of β̃c (the average speed per road category) and
a calibrated value of βtime ensures that the parameters are identified using the same
framework as the measure of port quality, and that they are consistent with the
context of India.
One might be concerned about the fact that the port qualities are estimated using
a fixed effect, and that fixed effects are usually not consistently estimated. In my
case, this is not a concern because the number of ports is fixed and does not grow
5In particular, I also try starting points where the order of βc is counterintuitive (e.g. cost on normal roads is




This section presents the estimation results.
1.5.1 Port elasticity
I run the estimation at different levels of regional and sectoral aggregation. I
compute the port shares as the share of firms that use a port within a sector-origin-
destination group. Table 1.2 displays the results.
Table 1.2: Elasticity estimation results
District level Postal code level
Pooled ISIC3 ISIC5 Pooled ISIC3 ISIC5
σ−1
θ 0.886 0.889 0.878 0.890 0.876 0.876
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
N 2,587,540 289,036 134,536 262,597 686,531 219,800
Cluster destination pair
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating the elasticity parameter using the strategy outlined in section 1.4.
All results estimates point toward a port elasticity that is slightly higher than
the trade elasticity. With a trade elasticity of 5 (e.g. Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare,
2014) corresponding to σ − 1 = 5, the port elasticity would be around 5/0.88 ≈ 5.7.
This implies that if a port’s cost increases by 1%, its share would decrease by around
5.7%.
Appendix A.3.1 displays similar results when computing the port shares by num-
bers of transactions or by value. In all cases the ratio is between 0.7 and 1.
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1.5.2 Infrastructure quality
I use the national highway network extracted from Open Street Map (OSM) to
compute the fastest routes.6 I keep all roads tagged as national highways or state
highways with more than two lanes, and allow the trade cost to differ by road cat-
egory, where I create two categories: expressway (two or more lanes per direction,
physical separation in the middle), and normal roads (typically, on the National
Highway, these would have two lanes in total, shared for both directions). Express-
ways constitute around 25% of the total National Highway length. I take the OSM
data as of January 2020 and estimate equation (1.12) using the average 2018-19
origin-port-destination shares. Appendix A.1.3 discusses the potential issues with
the road data and compares it with official statistics to show that the user-generated
OSM data matches official statistics well. Table 1.3 displays the results.














Notes: The table shows the estimates of the PPML estimation using the least-cost route after convergence of the
cost parameters.
6Open Street Map is a crowd-sourced map of the world, where users can add or modify roads, including details
about the road such as number of lanes, oneway, and road names.
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Roads As one would expect, distance on the expressway has a smaller negative
impact on the probability of choosing a port than distance on normal roads. The
difference between βexpressway and βroad is both statistically and economically signif-
icant: the cost associated with traveling on a normal road is about 25% higher than
that of traveling on an expressway. If only time spent on the road matters, and given
a highway speed of 70km/h, the estimate would imply a speed of around 55km/h on
a normal road, which is of the right order of magnitude. The distance of the port to
the final destination also has the expected negative impact on the choice of the port,
with an elasticity of around 0.81. The coefficient has the structural interpretation
of θ ∗ η, where η is the elasticity of trade costs with respect to sea distance. Using
my estimate σ−1
θ
≈ 0.88, this results implies an elasticity of trade to sea-distance of
around 0.81∗0.88 ≈ 0.7. This is in the range of the review of values for the elasticity
of trade to distance by Disdier and Head (2008).7
Interpreting β̃c as the (inverse) average speed on the category, using θ = 5.7
consistent with usual trade elasticity values and the estimate above, and assuming
a speed of 70km/h on the expressway (β̃c = 1/70) implies that the semi-elasticity of
trade cost to time of travel in hours is around 0.042 (.00339 ∗ 70/5.7). This implies
that an additional hour of travel time is equivalent to a 4.2% ad-valorem trade cost.
This is lower, but in the same order of magnitude, as the estimate of 0.07 from Allen
and Arkolakis (2019) for the US. It is to be expected that the cost would be lower
in India due to lower labor cost.
Ports To ensure that the estimated fixed effect really captures changes in costs,
Figure 1.2 displays the scatterplot of the estimated port fixed effect estimates against
7Disdier and Head (2008) find an average value of 0.9, and report that 90% of published estimates lie between
0.28 and 1.5. Feyrer (2009) estimates sea-distance elasticity in particular, based on the closure of the Suez Canal,
and finds a long run elasticity of around 0.5.
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three types of measures of port quality, for port for which the measures are available.
The left panel compares the fixed effect to the average turnaround time taken between
the ship entrance in the port and its exit. A longer turnaround time is associated
with a lower port productivity. The center panel compares the estimate to the output
handled at the port by ship-berth-day. The higher the output per ship-berth-day,
the higher the productivity. Finally, the right panel shows that the fixed effect also
correlates with the port’s topography: larger ships need a wider turning circle, and
ports with higher fixed effect are able to accommodate larger ships.
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Notes: The left panel plots the estimated port fixed effect against the average turnaround time it takes between
when the ship enters and exists the port. The center panel displays the port fixed effect against the average port
output per ship-berth-day, which is the total tonnage handled at the port divided by the number of days a ship was
docked at the berth. The right panel plots the fixed effect against the turning circle diameter of the port. Larger
ships need a wider turning circle.
Table 1.4 shows the estimates of − ln τρ relative to the best port for the 10 largest
Indian ports and some summary statistics over the 22 ports in my sample. The vari-
ation across ports is large: the standard deviation across ports is between 28% and
16% depending on the port elasticity value, which can be interpreted as differences
in ad-valorem trade costs. To put some perspective on this number, compare it to
the cost of traveling by road. The standard deviation of the port fixed effect (1.6)
is equivalent to 1.6/.00422 ≈ 380 kilometers travelled on the road. In other words,
a firm would be indifferent (up to the idiosyncratic costs) between using a port, or
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using a better port one standard deviation less costly but 380km further away. Us-
ing the same computation, a firm is indifferent between using the median port and
driving an additional 280km to the best port.
Turning to observables, the standard deviation in turnaround times across ports
is around 1.48 days. Using the coefficient of −1.42 when regressing the port fixed
effect on turnaround time, a one standard deviation improvement in the turnaround
time is associated with an improvement of 2.1 in the port fixed effect, the same order
of magnitude as the actual standard deviation of the port fixed effects or higher
(1.6). In other words, the standard deviation of the estimated port qualities roughly
matches the standard deviation of observed turnaround times. How realistic is the
coefficient of −1.42? Using θ = 5.7, this is equivalent to a 25% ad-valorem trade
cost for every 24 hours of turnaround time (1.42/5.7 ≈ 0.25). Given the estimated
semi-elasticity of 4.2% ad-valorem trade cost per each additional hour of driving from
above, this is equivalent to around 6 hours of driving. Given the truck would stay
idle during the 24 hours, it makes sense that the cost of an additional day of waiting
for the ship to be ready would be lower than what the driving time implies.
The left panel of Figure 1.3 displays the ports on the Indian map, where the
size of each port is proportional to its estimated quality (a larger circle represents a
lower cost). It is apparent that while the geographical distribution of port location
is fairly balanced, the geographical distribution of port quality isn’t and regions
in the North-East are further aways from ports with low costs. The right panel of
Figure 1.3 shows the road network, with expressways displayed as bold red solid lines
and normal roads displayed as dashed blue lines. Historically, the first large scale
expressway build in India was the Golden Quadrilateral, connecting Delhi, Mumbai,
Chennai and Kolkota. The North-South (going from North of Delhi to the southern
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Table 1.4: Estimated port quality
Port Name Port fixed effect Implied quality
(−θ lnτ̂ρ) (θ = 5.7) (θ = 10)
Nava Sheva 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mundra -0.65 0.11 0.06
Chennai -1.22 0.21 0.12
Tuticorin -1.20 0.21 0.12
Kolkata -2.96 0.52 0.30
New Mangalore -2.36 0.41 0.24
Vishakhapatnam -2.39 0.42 0.24
Kochi -1.66 0.29 0.17
Kattupalli -2.22 0.39 0.22
Mumbai -5.16 0.90 0.52
Average -1.46 0.26 0.15
Median -1.20 0.21 0.12
Standard dev. 1.60 0.28 0.16
Notes: This table displays the estimated port qualities, defined as the negative of ln τρ. The largest 10 ports in
my dataset are displayed, and they account for around 75% of total shipments through sea. The Kolkata port
includes both the Haldia dock complex and Kolkota dock system. The summary statistics are weighted by total
value transiting through the ports.
tip of India, passing through the center of India) and East-West corridor (from the
western state of Gujarat to the eastern state of Assam) were build afterwards. The
graph shows that other segments of the road network are also expressways, but that
a substantial part is made of roads with only two lanes for both directions. For
example, the central region is linked with Dehli and the south by an expressway,
but its connectivity to the east and west coasts requires passing through patches of
normal roads.
To assess how the heterogeneity in export costs due to road or to ports translates
into regional output and welfare disparities, I next incorporate the port choice model
into a full quantitative model to conduct counterfactuals.
1.6 Full quantitative model
The quantitative model I develop here is very similar to the Krugman (1980)
model, with modified trade costs. There are N regions, which can be either Indian
23


















Notes: This left panel displays the ports on the map of India, where the size of the circle represents the estimated
quality of the port. The right panel displays the road network, where “expressways” are displayed in red and “normal
roads” are displayed in blue.
districts or foreign countries, and two sectors (non-tradable services and tradable
goods).
1.6.1 Preferences
Each region d has a representative consumer whose utility is Cobb-Douglass over




where Sd is the quantity of services consumed and Gd is a CES aggregate of a











Optimality implies that consumers spend XGd = αdXd on manufacturing goods, and
XSd = (1− αd)Xd on services, where Xd is region d’s total spending. Within the
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goods composite, expenditure on each variety is given by:













1−σ is the ideal price index of the goods CES aggregate.
The consumption price index is then given by Pd = c
(
PGd
)αd (P Sd )1−αd , where c is a
normalization constant.
Each region is endowed with Ld units of labor, supplied inelastically. I assume
that labor is perfectly mobile across the two sectors, reflecting the fact that my
counterfactuals are designed to study long-term effects of infrastructure changes.
1.6.2 Production
Services Services are not tradable. The production of services uses labor only,
with the following production function:





where ASd is labor productivity in the production of services in region d. There is
perfect competition, so the price of services in region d is wSd /A
S
d , and total sales are




d , where wd is the wage in region d.
Goods The production of manufacturing goods is similar to Krugman (1980). The
is a continuum of firms in each region. Each firm i produces a differentiated variety
corresponding to a good i. Firms compete in a monopolistically competitive fashion,
and the production features a fixed cost of entry and a constant marginal cost. More
precisely, a firm i in region o is required to pay a fixed cost fo in units of labor to
enter the market, and requires 1/Ao units of labor to produce each marginal unit
of good. Trade of goods is costly. A firm located in an Indian district o needs to
ship d̃od units of goods to have 1 unit reach an other Indian district d, where d̃od is
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fixed, common to all firms in o, and depends on the quality of the roads. To ship
to a foreign country d through port ρ, the firm i faces the iceberg trade cost defined









in a foreign region o shipping to an other foreign country d faces an iceberg trade cost
d̃od, common to all firms in o. To ship to an Indian district through Indian port ρ, it
also faces an idiosyncratic cost that depends on the port, in a symmetric vein as the
Indian exporters. The firms only learn their idiosyncratic port-route productivities
εioρd after paying the fixed cost.
Conditional on entry, profit maximization combined with the CES demand func-
tion implies that exports to destination d are given by:


























Taking expectation over the Fréchet draws that enter d̃od (i), expected variable profits















where dod = d̃od when o and d are Indian districts, or when both o and d are foreign
countries. When o is an Indian district and d is a foreign country, and vice-versa, so
















Integrating equation (1.15) over firms and their corresponding Fréchet draws, total














where N fo is the number of manufacturing firms entering production in region o.






































P 1−σd︸ ︷︷ ︸
equal to expected variable profits
+N fo fo.
Zero expected profits implies that the variable profits are equal to the fixed cost
wGo fo. Plugging that in the total labor demand from the goods sector gives the





Goods and services market clearing Market clearing in the service sector implies
that expenditure on services equals total sales in services and total labor payment
in services:





d = (1− αd)Xd,







where Y Go are total manufacturing sales of region d. Further assuming balanced trade











Y Gd = X
G
d . As a consequence:
∑
d




d = (1− αd)wdXd,
so that the sectoral labor allocation to services is determined by the share of services
in consumption:
LSd = (1− αd)Xd,
and aggregate labor market equilibrium implies that:
LSo = αoLo = σN
f
o fo.
Equilibrium system In the end, equilibrium is a set of trade flow XGod, total con-




o , number of firms N
f
o , wages wo
and goods sector price indices PGo that satisfy




(1− αo)Lo = LSo(1.17)
• Budget constraint and balanced trade in goods












































1 if o = d





if o ∈ IN and d /∈ IN , or d ∈ IN and o /∈ IN
1.7 Counterfactuals
I use the model to solve for changes in district-level real wags following changes
in either port costs (τρ) or costs on the road to the port (τoρ).
1.7.1 Solution method and model calibration
I solve for counterfactual real wage changes by using Dekle et al. (2008)’s frame-
work of exact-hat algebra detailed in Appendix A.5.1. For that purpose, the only




d and port shares
πoρd, as well as parameter values for σ and θ. I use the common value of the trade
elasticity of 5 (e.g. Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare, 2014), corresponding to σ = 6,
and a value for θ of 5/0.88 ≈ 5.7, consistent with my estimates. Since my sample
of firms doesn’t cover all Indian districts, and data on trade at the district level is
unavailable, I need to impute some port shares and trade shares.
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Port shares To calibrate port shares of the missing districts, it is straightforward
to compute them using the road cost estimates τoρ, port-level cost estimates τρ, and






where τoρ depend on the road costs estimates, τρ come from the port productivity
estimates, and τρd depend on the sea estimate. Because I don’t have data on import
port shares at the origin country level, I assume that the relative port productivities
are the same for export and import and impute the port shares for import in the
same way. In that case τoρ is the sea cost and τρd is the road cost.
Trade shares Trade shares are observable at the country-country level, but not
at the district-country or district-district level. To calibrate the unobservable trade
shares in a theory consistent way, I follow a similar approach to Eckert (2019) who
infers unobservable service trade flows in the US from the gravity structure and other
region-level data. It is useful to rewrite the equilibrium conditions in the goods sector
into the following single equation where the only endogenous object is the vector of
Xo. Combining equations (1.21), (1.20) and (1.22), the following equation holds:








1−σ αdXd︸ ︷︷ ︸
data
,









. In this equation, the αoXo terms can be taken di-
rectly form data on region GDP and goods consumption shares. The dod terms are
known from the trade cost calibration on road, sea, and ports (up to a normalization
constant), and the λo’s are the only unknown.
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Equation (1.24) is useful to calibrate the model, because there is a unique vector
of λo consistent with data on αoXo and trade frictions dod (see the useful Lemma A.1
in Appendix A.4.1, taken from Eckert (2019)). Since data on trade across Indian
districts and between districts and foreign countries is not readily available, I use
equation (1.24) to recover the λo from data on district and foreign country level
GDPs as well as road and sea distances to compute Xo and τ̃od.
The last hurdle to solve is that the port-level productivities τρ are only estimated
up to a constant, and that trade costs also include additional components not taken
into account by the road, port, and sea components, such as tariffs or language
barriers. To jointly solve for these issues, I add a set of origin- and destination-specific
free parameters scaling the district-foreign trade costs that allow me to match the
aggregate India-foreign trade shares exactly, while using the road and ports relative
costs to calibrate the relative shares of Indian districts in the aggregate India-foreign
shares. Appendix A.4.1 describes the procedure in details.
The result of the calibration procedure is a vector of λo from which the trade




1−σ . The recovered trade
shares are consistent with observed district-level GDPs, goods consumption shares,
and country-level trade shares.
Finally, the structure of the model gives an expression for the goods price index







1−σ. I combine it with district-level data
on population to compute a baseline real wage at the Indian district level. The
real wage is given by wd/Pd, where Pd = c
(
PGd
)αd (P Sd )1−αd . Because the price of
services P Sd = wd/A
S
d is unobservable, I construct a baseline real wage that ignores
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−αd logPGd︸ ︷︷ ︸
model+data
+ logASd︸ ︷︷ ︸
unknown
.
My measure of the real wage is the sum of the first two terms, which correspond
to the real wage up to productivity differentials in the service sector. While I don’t
need it to solve for counterfactual real wage changes, I will correlate the change in
real wage against this initial real wage to assess if the counterfactual changes in
infrastructure have an equalizing effect between districts. The change in real wage
in the counterfactuals is exactly equal to the change in my measure of initial real
wage, as all my counterfactuals keep the service productivity ASd constant.
Data sources I use the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) Tables to get
data on country-level trade shares (πod) in the goods sector, and the share of goods in
consumption (αd).
8 I get data on district-level GDP in India from ICRISAT for 535
Indian districts, and population data for 636 districts or union territories from the
2011 Indian Census. The ICRISAT data doesn’t cover all districts. To calibrate GDP
in the missing districts, I use additional data on the share of literacy by district from
the Census and on night lights from Asher et al. (2021) to predict GDP per capita
based on these observables.9 I first regress GDP per capita on population, literacy
and maximum observed night lights using data on the 535 available districts. I then
use the coefficients to predict GDP per capita in other districts, which I multiply by
8I define goods as Agriculture, Mining, and Manufacturing. The average share of goods in final consumption is
around 0.38 across countries. I use the aggregate India value of 0.39 for all Indian districts. The country-level trade
shares together with balanced trade imply a level of goods expenditure for each country.
9Following Henderson et al. (2012), a large literature as been using night-light as a measure for real income when
official data is missing. Alder (2019) uses it in the context of India. Here, I don’t use it as a measure, but rather as
a predictor of GDP per capita.
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Data share of interstate trade
Linear fit 45 degree line
Notes: The figure displays the share of interstate imports in the model against the data. Each dot is the share of
bilateral flows in the exporting state’s total interstate exports. Each dot is the share of state-destination flows in the
state’s total international exports.
population to construct GDP for the missing districts. The correlation between the
predicted and observed GDP for the districts with existing data is high at 0.9.
The resulting model consists of 56 countries, 636 districts and a composite rest of
the world. Trade between the districts and the rest of the world takes place through
22 ports. Within India trade between districts takes place on the road network
depicted in Figure 1.3.
Model calibration fit Figure 1.4 shows how the calibrated within-India trade shares
perform against untargeted data. The panel compares the model with data on more
aggregated inter-state trade shares within India. The interstate trade flows data
refer to the 2015-16 flows published in the 2016-2017 Indian Economic Survey. The
correlation is around 0.72.
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1.7.2 Counterfactuals cost changes
Improvement counterfactuals
I perform three counterfactuals that harmonize the quality of infrastructures for
all region and bring them to the best level. The first one is a world in which all ports
have the level of the best port. The second one is a world in which all costs to the
port are what they would be if all roads where expressways, but internal trade costs
remain constant, to isolate the effect of internal trade costs on international market
access. The third simulates a counterfactual where all roads are expressways, and
all internal trade costs as well as costs to the port diminish.
The counterfactual changes in port quality are computed by simulating a change





where minp τp is the minimum port cost. That is, I bring all ports to the best level.
To equate road infrastructure everywhere, I change τoρ in the following way:






This counterfactual abstracts away from the effect of road improvement on internal
trade costs. This is useful to isolate the international market access component of
changes in infrastructure. I also run the road improvement counterfactual allowing
for internal trade costs to change when the roads are improved, where the formula
of district-to-district trade cost changes is the same as in equation (1.26).
Bottleneck ports
In a final counterfactual, I compute the gains associated with improving each
port individually. I define the “bottleneck” port as the one that leads to the highest
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Table 1.5: Real wage changes - counterfactuals results
Equal ports Equal road Equal roads
(τρ) to ports (τoρ) (incl. internal)
Average 5.99 0.27 2.32
Median 4.79 0.08 2.15
Std. 5.26 0.39 1.40
P25 0.98 0.02 1.28
P75 10.3 0.41 3.13
Notes: This table shows summaries of the percentage change in real wages across Indian districts in the counterfac-
tuals. The summary statistics are weighted by district population. “Equal ports” refers to the counterfactual where
all ports costs are put to the same level as the minimum port cost. “Equal road to ports (τoρ)” refers to the scenario
where costs from Indian districts to the ports are lowered to their level if all roads where expressways, but internal
trade costs between Indian districts remain constant. “Equal roads (incl. internal)” changes all internal trade costs
(to the port and between districts) to the level they would be at if all roads where expressways.
change in real wages. In practice, I reduce each port’s iceberg cost by 10% and
compute the counterfactual real wage change for all regions. This also allows me to
compute which port is the bottleneck for different districts in India.
1.7.3 Counterfactual results
Table 1.5 shows the results of the counterfactuals. It shows summary statistics
of the percentage change in real wages across Indian districts, weighted by district
population. The first column displays the results of bringing all ports to the best
level, the middle column displays the results of bringing all costs to the ports their
level if all roads where expressways, and the last column shows the results when all
roads are expressways and internal trade costs also change as a result.
Overall, changes in average real wage are large when ports are improved, with
an increase in real wage of about 6%. This is an order of magnitude higher than
when access to ports is improved, as the second column shows an average real wage
increase of 0.27% only. This implies that improving port infrastructure rather than
connections to the port has a larger impact on international market access and in
turn welfare. Even when internal costs are reduced as a result of road improvement
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(column 3), the average welfare change of road improvement is about half of that of
port improvements.
The distributional impact of these counterfactual is also large, with the standard
deviation across districts of the same order of magnitude as the average effect. Fig-
ure 1.5 displays the real wage changes across Indian districts in the infrastructure
improvement counterfactuals. Dark red implies a larger increase in real wage, while
blue implies a lower increase.
The left panel shows the real wage change when all ports are brought to the
best level. Regions near the coast benefit more from the lower port costs. Within
coastal regions, there is also heterogeneity in how much districts gain, with a direct
link to the map of estimated port quality in Figure 1.3. Districts on the central
West coast, close to the most productive port of Nava Sheva (Mumbai), as well as
in the south close to the (relatively) more productive port of Tuticorin, are lighter
than districts near low quality ports such as in the North-East. On the other hand,
districts along the the North-East coast are relatively better off because the high-cost
ports of Vishakhapatnam and Paradip are improved in the counterfactual.
Improving access to port benefits regions whose current connectivity to ports is
low, such as the center of India. The Golden Quadilateral highway connecting Delhi
(to the North), Mumbai (to the West), Chennai (to the South-East) and Kolkata
(to the North-East) is clearly visible on the map of road improvements (middle and
right panel of Figure 1.5, to compare with the road network displayed in Figure
1.3). Regions located close to the existing expressways that connect to the ports
don’t benefit as much from the road improvements. In the middle panel, the North-
South corridor expressway cannot be discerned because it is not used to reach the
port, so that regions in the center benefit from road improvement to the port even
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though they already have an important expressway passing through. The right panel
does show that the central regions benefit slightly less when internal trade costs also
decrease, since they are already connected to important economic centers such as
Delhi through an expressway.
Figure 1.5: District-level counterfactual real wage changes
Equal ports Equal Road to Port Equal roads
Notes: The left panel displays the district-level change in real wage when all ports are brought to the level of the
best port. The middle panel displays the district-level change in real wage when all cost to the ports are brought to
the level achieved if all roads where expressways, but internal trade costs are kept constant. The right panel shows
the changes when internal trade costs also decrease after road improvements. Red districts benefit more while blue
districts benefit less.
The regional heterogeneity might have either positive or negative impact on re-
gional inequality, depending on wether regions that benefit more had originally higher
or lower welfare. Figure 1.6 displays the binscatter plot of the change in district real
wage against the initial relative real wage. In the ports improvement scenario, dis-
tricts with higher initial wages tend to benefit relatively more from the port improve-
ments, thereby increasing regional inequality. Accordingly, the standard deviation
in log real wages increases by 8% from 24% to 26%. This is explained by the fact
that coastal regions have a higher initial wage, and benefit disproportionately more
from the reduction in port costs. In the road to port improvement scenario, there
is no significant change in regional variation. The right panel shows that improving
the roads has a modest equalizing effect, as regions with higher lower wage benefit
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Initial relative wage (log x 100)
Ports Roads (to port) Roads (incl. internal)
Notes: The figure displays the bin-scatter plot of real wage changes against initial real wage in the infrastructure
improvement scenarios.
less. The standard deviation in log real wages drops by 2%.
Overall, the counterfactual results show that on aggregate, port improvements
might have more potential in terms of average welfare improvement than road im-
provements. However, port improvement has relative distributional consequences in
favor of coastal regions. While road improvements have lower aggregate effect, their
distributional impacts are different from port improvements and policymakers might
find a combination useful to balance the effects of infrastructure improvement across
all regions.
Bottleneck ports An other way to balance distributional consequences of port
improvement is to improve specific ports depending on which regions are targeted.
Figure 1.7 makes this point clear by plotting the bottleneck port for each district.
The bottleneck port is defined as the port for which the real wage change is the
largest when each port is individually improved by 10%. It is clear that targeting
different ports has distributional consequences: improving the two west coast ports
of Mundra and Nava Sheva (Mumbai) would result in larger gains for most districts,
but less so for regions in the south and east.
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Figure 1.7: District-level bottleneck port
District-level bottleneck port
Notes: The figure displays the port that has the largest effect on the district’s real wage when improved.
1.7.4 Robustness
I check the sensitivity of my results to changes in the estimate of the port elasticity
θ and to the fact that the port cost estimates are estimated as fixed effects while the
road cost parameters are based on observables.
Port elasticity sensitivity I run the counterfactuals based on higher and lower
values of the ratio between the trade elasticity and the port elasticity. My estimates
from section 1.5 imply a value of σ−1
θ
around 0.88, but estimates in the robustness
appendix A.3.1 range between 0.7 and 1. I run the counterfactuals using these values,
resulting in values of θ of 7.1 and 5.
In all cases, the relative ranking of port improvement, access to port improvement,
and overall road improvement stays the same as in the baseline estimate. As θ
decreases, the differential in port costs implied by the differences in shares increases.
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Hence for lower θ, the variation across ports is higher and bringing all ports to the
best level results in larger reduction in overall trade costs.
Port cost estimates The results in the previous section imply that bringing ports to
the best level results in higher welfare gains than transforming all roads to express-
ways. A potential explanation for this result is that the port costs are estimated
by fixed effects while the road costs are based on regression on observables. The
variation in the fixed effect might be higher because it picks up variation not con-
tained in observables, while the variation in road costs in constrained to variation in
observables.
As a robustness check, I rerun the port counterfactual by first projecting the
port fixed effects on the port-level turnaround time, and then use the estimated
coefficient to predict changes in port cost by bringing all turnaround times to the
shortest observed turnaround time.10 The resulting counterfactual wage changes,
summarized in the last column of Table 1.6 are of similar magnitudes as the baseline,
implying that the variation in observable measures of productivity also leads to large
reductions in trade costs.
1.7.5 Infrastructure improvement costs
The previous section shows that the welfare gains from port improvements are
larger than the gains from road improvements. This sections provides an estimate
of the costs associated with both improvement scenarios.
Port improvement costs To estimate the costs of improving ports, I use data on
investments made as part of India’s Sagarmala program. That program established
10Precisely, I regress the estimated port cost on the turnaround time as in the left panel of Figure 1.2. I then feed
in changes in τρ such that d ln τρ = β̂turnaround
(




Table 1.6: Real wage changes - robustness
θ = 7.1 θ = 5 Equal turn-
Port Road (τoρ) Road (all) Port Road (τoρ) Road (all) around time
Average 4.37 0.23 2.06 7.15 0.29 2.48 5.51
Median 3.77 0.10 1.91 5.40 0.07 2.27 4.41
Std. 3.54 0.31 1.21 6.51 0.44 1.50 4.74
Notes: This table shows summaries of the percentage change in real wages across Indian districts in the robustness
checks. “Port” refers to the counterfactual where all ports costs are put to the same level as the minimum port cost.
“Road (τoρ)” refers to the scenario where costs from Indian districts to the ports are lowered to their level if all
roads where expressways, but internal trade costs between Indian districts remain constant. “Road (all)” changes all
internal trade costs (to the port and between districts) to the level they would be at if all roads where expressways.
a list of planned improvements of ports and port connectivity projects in 2016. I
retrieve the list of project that contains the details of the targeted port, the amount
budgeted for the project, and whether the project has already been completed, is
under completion, or hasn’t been implemented yet as of end of 2019.11
Taking log-differences of the port share equation (1.2) between 2015 and 2019
gives:
(1.27) lnπoρd,2019 − ln πoρd,2015 = θ∆ ln τρ + θ∆ ln τoρ + θ∆ ln τρd + αod.
I parametrize the change in port-level cost ∆ ln τρ = β
investinvestportimp.ρ , where
investportimp.ρ is the amount of dollars spent in investments on port improvements
(in dollars), and estimate the following equation:
(1.28) ln πoρd,2019 − lnπoρd,2015 = θβinvestinvestportimp.ρ + αod + uoρd.
The error term uoρd contains the changes in other unobservable port-destination costs
and origin-port costs. Investments are potentially correlated with that error term if
policymakers target ports where they are able to anticipate changes in origin-port
and port-destination costs. To assess the relevance of the identification threat, I run
11Examples of port improvements include additional berth or jetties construction, container x-ray scanner instal-
lations, or additional truck parking spaces. See additional details about the program at http://sagarmala.gov.in.
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a placebo test using the timing of different investments. The full list of projects
under the Sagarmala umbrella was crafted prior to April 2016, when the list was
published together with costs estimates. Some projects were completed, some were
under completion, and some were still under preparation at the end of my sample
in 2019. My placebo test estimates equation (1.27), using completed investments,
partially completed investments, and planned but not started investments. If projects
targeted ports with anticipated growth in the uoρd residual, the planned investments
would be correlated with port share growth. Table 1.7 shows the results of the
estimation. Reassuringly, planned investments are not significantly correlated with
port share growth.
Table 1.7: Effects of improvement investments







origin-dest FE yes yes yes
N 30,260 30,260 30,260
Port cluster yes yes yes
The estimate in the first column of Table 1.7 has the structural interpretation of
θβinvest, and implies that an additional billion USD spending on port improvement
reduces the port’s (log) iceberg trade cost by around 0.065 (0.37/5.7), using my
estimate of θ = 5.7. Using this estimate and the fact that improving all ports to the
best level implies a cumulated change in port (log) iceberg trade cost of 15.31, the
total cost of the port improvement counterfactual is around 235 billion USD.12
12Note that the final result of this computation is actually independent of θ, because the port iceberg trade costs
are taken from the port fixed effect divided by θ, and the coefficient in Table 1.7 is also divided by θ.
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Road improvement costs To estimate the costs of improving the road network
to expressways, I take all projects under the Sagarmala program that improve road
segments from 2 lanes to 4 lanes, and compute the average cost per kilometer. The
cost is around 1.52 million dollars, and multiplying this average cost by the total
distance improved under the road improvement counterfactual yields a total cost of
around 250 billion dollars, of the same order of magnitude as the port improvement
cost estimate.
As a result, while the potential gains from port improvement are higher than
those of road improvement, their cost is of similar magnitude. This implies that port
improvements might be a more interesting avenue for infrastructure improvement.13
1.8 Conclusion
Port and road infrastructure connect regions to the world market. In this paper,
I build a framework to estimate the cost of using the two types of infrastructure, and
to compare their relative importance in shaping international market access. I find
that port infrastructure improvements might improve aggregate welfare relatively
more than road improvement for comparable costs. I also show that their regional
distributional implication are different: port improvements benefit coastal regions
relatively more, while road improvements tend to benefit inland regions. Policy-
makers interested interested in targeting specific regions might thus favor one or the
other type of infrastructure improvement depending on whether they want to target
inland or coastal regions.
13This back of the envelope computation makes numerous simplifying assumptions. It doesn’t take into account
maintenance costs and assume that the costs of port improvement are constant. As a results, I don’t interpret the
exact difference in cost magnitudes not compare it to the potential gains, but limit myself to the conclusion that the
port and road improvement counterfactuals have a cost of similar magnitude.
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CHAPTER II
Migrants, Trade, and Market Access
2.1 Introduction
Immigrants affect both the local supply of labor, and the demand for output pro-
duced by a geographic unit. The majority of research on the impact of immigration
on natives has focused on understanding the wage impact of the migrant labor supply
(e.g. Card, 1990; Abramitzky and Boustan, 2017). This paper instead explores the
impact of migration on market access – the demand for output produced by a geo-
graphic unit. I use data on US states’ intra- and inter-national trade and migration
to calibrate a multi-region model to estimate and quantify the impact of immigration
into the United States on market access faced by US states.
I emphasize two economic mechanisms. First, immigrants increase the intra-
national market access. Immigrants demand goods and services from both the state
they reside, and other US states. A fall in the US migrant population is a reduction
in US states’ market access, as overall demand shifts towards higher export trade cost
destinations. The effect is heterogeneous: states that rely more on immigrant demand
for their output, both from within-state migrants and from immigrants living in other
US states, experience greater reductions in market access. In an environment with
inter-state trade linkages, this change in market access is distinct from the change
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a) Migrant demand exposure b) Residuals of exports against residuals
against migrant share of the migrant stock, after controlling
of population for multilateral resistance and distance
in the in-state immigrant population. The left panel of Figure 2.1 illustrates this
point by plotting the share of a state’s output sold to migrants residing in the US
against the share of migrant population in the state.1 If the share of migrants was
uniform across states, or if each state was a closed economy, all states would line
up on the 45-degree line. States located above the line have a bigger exposure to
migrant demand than their own immigrant population would imply, predicting they
would suffer relatively more from a decrease in overall US migrant population. In
this paper, I show that this heterogeneity across states leads to unequal effects of a
nationwide change in migrant population.
The second mechanism is that immigrants expand international market access,
by reducing the costs of foreign trade (see e.g. Gould, 1994; Ottaviano et al., 2018;
Cardoso and Ramanarayanan, 2019). The right panel of Figure 2.1 illustrates this for
the US, by plotting exports from a state to a country against the stock of migrants
from that country residing in the state, after controlling for multilateral resistance
1Formally, I compute the share of output sold to migrants in the US, for a state i as:
sharei =
∑
j∈US Xij ∗ sh migj∑
j Xij
,
where sh migj is the share of migrants in j’s population.
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and distance.2 In this paper, I estimate the causal impact of migrants on exports in
the US using an instrumental variable approach based on push-pull factors similar
to Burchardi et al. (2019). I show that migrants have a positive causal impact on
exports from US states to their country or origin, and that the positive effect of
migrants on trade comes mainly through high-skill rather than low-skill migrants.
I build a model combining Ricardian trade, labor mobility, and an endogenous
response of trade costs to migration. I calibrate it to an economy composed of
the 50 US states, the District of Columbia, and 56 countries, to provide the first
quantitative assessment of the effect of migration on natives’ welfare through shaping
both intra- and inter-national market access of US states. I estimate an elasticity
of exports to migrant population of around 0.2 which I use to calibrate the model.
I simulate a counterfactual scenario where migrant population in the US is reduced
by half, about the same as bringing migrant population share to 1980 levels. This
would increase export weighted trade costs by 3.5% on average across US states,
which is of similar magnitude as the 4.9% current ad valorem export tariffs faced by
US exporters (WEF, 2016). The reduction in migrant population would lead to a
decrease in aggregate US-born welfare by 0.13%. The average real wage change in US
states drops by 0.16%, decomposed into −0.11% due to reduced international market
access, −0.31% due to reduced market access from other states, and +0.26% due to
own-state migrant reduction. The effect of own-state migrant reduction captures
the reduction of labor competition net of the loss of market access from own-state
migrants. There is substantial heterogeneity across US states, with changes in real
wages ranging from −0.44% in Vermont to 0.20% in New Jersey. Differences in intra-
national migrant demand exposure, export exposure, and local migrant population
2The figure is a bin-scatter plot of the residual of exports from state s to country c after controlling for s and c
fixed effects as well as bilateral distance, against the residual of the migrant stock from c living in s, after controlling
for s and c fixed effects as well a bilateral distance.
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share explain the regional dispersion of wage changes.
To supplement these results, I also investigate different effects of migration on
trade costs by skill. I find that high-skill migrants have a positive effect on ex-
ports, while low-skill migrants’ effect is muted. The elasticity of exports to high-skill
migrant population is around 0.3. Adding a skill dimension to the model induces
differential effects on high and low skill workers’ wages, and imperfect substitutabil-
ity between native and migrant workers induces an additional negative effect of the
removal of migrants. The two main mechanisms affecting market access, however,
are largely unaffected. The reduction of overall migrant share by half would result
in a decrease in US native workers’ welfare of 0.34% for low-skill and 0.37% for
high-skill workers on average. Again, regional heterogeneity would occur because of
differential migrant demand exposure across states. The larger overall drop in wel-
fare (0.13 against 0.34− 0.37) is explained by the complementarity between natives
and migrants’ labor, and a larger increase in export trade costs in the skill model
because high-skill migrants have a higher impact on export costs than in the pooled
regression.
This paper connects to the literature on quantitative assessment of migration,
more particularly in an international trade setting. Di Giovanni et al. (2015) study
the importance of trade and remittances in determining welfare effects of migration in
a model with exogenous migrant population. Caliendo et al. (2017) use a model with
endogenous migration and trade to quantify welfare effects of the European Union
expansion. Burstein et al. (2020) point out that an industry’s ability to increase
output through exports mediates how its native workers wage react to immigrant
inflows. Here, I emphasize that migrants themselves lead to a change in market
access. The quantitative framework in the present paper not only includes inter-
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national trade and migration, but also accounts for intra-national regional linkages
and the trade costs reduction effect of migrants, which few papers have done before.
Combes et al. (2005) models France’s internal trade costs as a function of internal
migrant stocks, and Cardoso (2019) develops a general equilibrium model based on
Melitz (2003), incorporating the trade costs reduction channel of migrants. Here, I
also model within-US trade and heterogeneity in migration and trade exposure to
analyze the effect of migration on a finer geographical level, connecting to the recent
strand of literature emphasizing the regional impact of trade (e.g. Caliendo et al.,
2019).
I also contribute to the empirical work on the trade cost reduction effect of mi-
grants. Gould (1994) first documented the fact that US states export more to coun-
tries from which they have a lot of migrants, and Dunlevy (2006) showed the cor-
relation depends on language proximity and corruption in the destination country.
Cardoso and Ramanarayanan (2019) use Canadian firm level data to show a similar
effect. Ottaviano et al. (2018) show that this also holds for exports in services. Bailey
et al. (2020) use social connection data based on Facebook to show that countries
with more social connection trade more. Some papers have used exogenous variation
such as random spatial allocation of refugees (Parsons and Vézina, 2018; Steingress,
2018) to identify the effect, but causal estimation of this phenomenon remains un-
derstudied (Felbermayr et al., 2015). In this paper, I confirm that the positive effect
of migrants on US exports survives an instrumental variable estimation, and show
that the effect is different across skill levels.
I also borrow from the literature on skill level substitutability (Katz and Mur-
phy, 1992) and migrant-native worker substitutability (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012) to
add these mechanisms in the model in an additional exercise. While these mech-
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anisms induce heterogeneity across skill, the market access and endogenous trade
costs mechanisms remain at play.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the quan-
titative framework used for the counterfactual analysis, Section 2.3 estimates the
sensitivity of exports to migrant population, and Section 2.4 presents the main
counterfactual results. Section 2.5 investigates the skill heterogeneity and imper-
fect substitutability between migrants and natives. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Quantitative framework
2.2.1 Model set up
Preferences and worker efficiency Workers born in region i and living in region n




where Wn is a CES aggregator of a continuum of goods and κin is a migration cost










where j is a variety, σ is the elasticity of substitution of consumption goods. For a









Workers supply their endowment of labor inelastically in the location they reside,
but have a different efficiency depending on where they were born and were they
reside. Specifically, worker ω born in region i and living in region n supplies bin(ω)





where ε is the shape parameter governing the dispersion of efficiencies and Bin is a
location parameter: workers from region i are in general more efficient in regions n
with higher Bin. This approach differs slightly from the location specific amenity
taste shock used in Redding (2016). It is related to the Roy-Fréchet occupation and
industry choice (Lagakos and Waugh, 2013; Hsieh et al., 2019) and has also been
used to model internal and international migration decisions (e.g. Bryan and Morten,
2019; Morales, 2019). It takes into account the fact that workers who self select into
migration tend to have a higher productivity in their country of destination.
Production and trade costs Labor is the only factor of production. Each location
draws an idiosyncratic productivity z(j) for each good j. The productivity draw are
iid and followsa Fréchet distribution:
Fn(z) = e
−Anz−θ ,
where θ is the shape parameter governing the dispersion of productivity and An is a
scale parameter governing average productivity. Assuming perfect competition and
an iceberg trade cost dni, the price at which location n can supply location i with





Trade costs are assumed to depend on the share of migrant in the exporter’s
population, and be given by:






if Nin 6= 0, and n ∈ US, i /∈ US or i ∈ US, n /∈ US
1 otherwise
,
where τni is an exogenous iceberg trade cost, and Nin is the population born in
location i and residing in n. η is the elasticity governing the sensitivity of trade
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costs to destination-born population residing in the origin location. I assume that
migration only matters for cross-border trade costs (when at least one of i or n is
not in the US), and not for within-US flows (when both i and n are in the US).
2.2.2 Trade and migration shares
Expenditure shares Following usual steps from Eaton and Kortum (2002), the


































and Γ is the Gamma function.







where wn is the wage in region n received by the worker, their only source of income.
The worker chooses the location with the highest indirect utility, so usual steps using
















where Nin is the number of people born in i and living in n. The corresponding
amount of efficient labor units supplied by workers born in i and living in n, denoted
















The equilibrium is a set of trade shares πtradeni , wages wn, efficiency labor units
Lin, migration shares π
mig
in , price indices Pn and trade costs din, which satisfy the
following set of equations given primitives Ai, Ni, Bin, κin and τin.






and in the labor market, total labor factor revenue is equal to total output because













































Finally, the trade costs are given by
(2.2)






if Nin 6= 0, and n ∈ US, i /∈ US or i ∈ US, n /∈ US
1 otherwise
3This expression is equal to the integral over efficiency draws bin (ω), where the density measure is the density of
bin (ω) conditional on the individual choosing to live in location n, multiplied by the total population in i.






2.2.4 Equilibrium in changes
Following steps similar to Dekle et al. (2008), one can solve for the proportional
change in variables (ŷ = ypost/ypre) given data on initial shares. The equilibrium
change in endogenous variables (π̂tradeni , π̂
mig
in , ŵn, P̂n and d̂ni) can be obtained from








































































+ 1 (i, n ∈ US)
]−η
.
Solving the model in proportional changes enables me to solve for counterfactual
quantities by using only data on baseline trade, migration, and wage bill shares
(πtradeis , π
mig







), as well as parameter values for ε, θ
and η.
Change in the welfare of natives The expected utility of a person born in location











where δ is a constant involving the Gamma function. Using the expression for πmigin
and solving for the change in welfare, one can show that the change in welfare for a













In reporting results, I will compute an aggregate measure of US welfare that is simply
the native-population weighted average of Ûi, for i ∈ US.
2.2.5 A simpler version to illustrate the mechanisms
To illustrate the mechanisms in play, consider a simpler version of the model where
migration is exogenous and workers have the same efficiency everywhere. Suppose
there are N states and a rest of the world region. Initially, every state is symmetric
except for the fraction of migrant in the state’s total population. To fix ideas, assume
that there is a total number of native US workers equal to L, each attributed to a
state in a fixed and exogenous proportion βi. The overall fraction of migrant in
the US is α, and the total migrant population is in the US is equal to α
1−αL and is
attributed to a state in a fixed and exogenous proportion γi.
It is straightforward to show that a state population is equal to αγi+(1−α)βi
1−α L. The
rest of the world native population is given by R, of which α
1−αL live in the US. For
simplicity, assume there is no migrants from the US into the rest of the world (RW).








for i ∈ US and BRWRW = Rα − 1.
We are interested in the reaction of wages in different states as the national fraction
of migrant α varies.5
5Because in the full model, the change in Bin is equivalent to a change in κ
ε
in, one can think of this comparative
static exercise as an approximation of what would happen in the full model if the migration costs to US states were
to increase uniformly for all foreign countries.
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The labor market clearing implies that:
wn
αγn + (1− α) βn
1− α
L︸ ︷︷ ︸




















Appendix B.1 shows that differentiating the previous equation with respect to α,
























































where RW denotes rest of the world. This expression implies that the deviation of
state n’s elasticity (ξn) from a weighted average of other regions’ elasticities (the left-












shmign), and the term on the last row that depends on export exposure.
A state with a high exposure to migrants in other states benefits more from an
overall increase in migrant population, as its internal market access increases with
additional migrants. When the own absorption share (Xnn/Xn) is low, the state is
worse off when its own migrant share increases, because the increased labor supply
is not compensated by a high enough increase in own expenditure. However, a low
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absorption share also implies that the state is selling its output to other states as well,
so that the two terms in the middle row are correlated. The sum of the two terms





) minus the share
of migrant in the state’s labor force. These are the two quantities depicted in the
introduction in the left panel of Figure 2.1 in the introduction. When overall migrant
demand exposure is higher than the migrant share, the wage reacts positively to the
influx of migrants because market access increases by more than labor supply.
The term on the last row shows how the reaction of wage depends on export
exposure. The first term inside the curly bracket captures the effect of the decrease
in export trade costs. It is increasing in the trade elasticity θ, and the migration
trade cost elasticity η, which is intuitive: a change in migrant population affects
trade costs which in turns affects exports. State n’s export trade cost elasticity with
respect to the aggregate migrant share α is equal to η multiplied by 1 minus the
share of migrant shmign.
6 Hence the first term in the square brackets represents the
decrease in trade costs and subsequent increase in trade share. The second term in
the square brackets, labeled “price index”, captures the effect of all the US states’
decrease in trade cost, which lower the RW price index and dampen the increase in
state n’s trade share. The second term in the curly brackets (MIGPOP/RWPOP )
illustrates the loss in revenue from exports, as demand moves towards the US. One
might expect this loss of export market access to be compensated by the increased
demand in the US. However the increased demand in the US is offset by the increased
labor competition from migrants. The offset is broken down when states are not
identical and trade with each others, and the middle row in equation (2.4) governs
the relative gains and losses.
6The share of migrants in state n is given by αγn
αγn+(1−α)βn
. The elasticity of the share of migrants with respect
to α is equal to βn
[αγn+(1−α)βn]
, which is equal to 1− shmign.
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Of course, these analytical results only hold for the simplified case where migra-
tion shares are exogenous, and don’t say anything about the evolution of the price
index, which is likely to fall as the labor supply moves toward closer locations in the
US. However, even in nominal terms, wages might increase following an increase in
migrant share if η is big enough to compensate for the loss in international demand.
To estimate the full effect of migration changes, I now turn to the calibration of the
quantitative model required to conduct counterfactuals.
2.3 Parameter estimation and calibration
To solve for counterfactual changes in the model, all that is left to do is specify
values for the trade elasticity θ, the migration cost elasticity ε and the trade cost
migration elasticity η. The first two elasticities have been estimated in the literature,
while the third one is still relatively understudied. For this reason, I estimate it in
this section.
2.3.1 Trade cost elasticity of migration
To estimate η, I use the gravity equation coming from the model and estimate it
using exports from the 50 US state and DC to the rest of the countries. Combining
equations (2.1) and (2.2) and taking logs gives the following estimation equation, for
exports from state s to country i:
logXsi = γs + δi − θ log τsi + θη log (Nis) + εsi.
I parametrize trade costs as a function of distance, and common border dummy:
(2.5) logXsi = γs + δi + θη log (Nis)− β1 log distsi + β2COMMONsi + εsi.
Note that all country level determinants of trade costs common to all US states, such
as tariffs, are included in the destination fixed effect.
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Instrument Migrants might choose to settle in a state because unobservable trade
frictions between their home country and the host state are correlated with unob-
servable migration costs, leading to an upward bias in an OLS regression. Migrants
could also target states that have low exports to their home country, because that
is where their country-specific skill would be especially beneficial in lowering export
costs. In that case, the OLS regression would have a downward bias.
Because of these endogeneity concerns, I instrument for migrant population using
a similar approach as Burchardi et al. (2019). I first define a leave-out pull factor
for migration destination state i at time t, computed as the share of migrants who
have entered the US at time t and who reside in state i, excluding migrants from








where Mj′i,t is the number of migrants from country j
′ residing in state i, who
migrated at time t. This leave-out pull factor represents the attractiveness of state
i to migrants from other continents at the year of migration t. I then construct a
leave-out push factor capturing population outflow from country j, by computing the
total migration from country j to the US at time t, minus those from country j to
state i (M−ij,t =
∑
i′ 6=iMji′,t). Multiplying the pull and push factors provides with an
instrument for the number of migrants from country i who entered the US at time
t and reside in state j that does not rely on any bilateral migration information.
Finally, summing over all years of migration provides with an instrument of the








The main identifying assumption is that the shares (pulljit) are uncorrelated with
unobservables affecting trade between state i and country j. In other words, migrants
from different continents should not be choosing their state of destination based on
that state’s exports to country j. This is likely to be satisfied, as migrants might
consider their own country’s or its neighbors’ ties to a specific destination, but not
that of countries in other continents. The estimation will use miginstrji as an
instrument for migrant stocks Lij.
Other studies have dealt with endogeneity concerns by using natural experiments
distributing the migrants of a single country across US states (e.g. Parsons and
Vézina, 2018). An advantage of my estimation strategy is that it uses many countries
which allows me to include importer and exporter fixed effects in the regression to
control for multilateral resistance terms.
Data sources for the estimation I use data from two sources to obtain a dataset
of migrant stocks, as well as trade flows, for the 50 US states (and the District
of Columbia) and 56 countries, with the reference year 2013.7 The data source
for migrant stocks in US states is the American Community Survey (ACS). The
ACS also contains the year of migration to the US, the state of residence, and the
country of origin which I use to construct the instrument. For trade flows at the
state-destination level, I use US Census Bureau data on state-level exports.
Results Table 2.1 shows the results of the estimation. The structural interpretation
of the coefficients on log (migrants) is θ × η. The results show a positive effect of
overall migrant population on exports, consistent with a reduction of export trade
costs. The elasticity of 0.2 is in line with existing estimates ranging from 0.1 to 0.4
7I use 56 countries because they are those for which I have data required to solve the quantitative model in the
next section. Appendix B.2 shows consistent regression results using a larger sample of countries.
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Table 2.1: Estimation of the effect of migrants on exports
OLS regression IV regression
log (exports) log (exports)




Imp. and exp. FE X X
Country clust. SE X X
First stage KPF-stat 791
N 2511 2511
Notes: Results from estimating equation 2.5, using the instrument described in the text. Standard errors in paren-
thesis, *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01
(Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010). The OLS coefficient is slightly lower, at 0.15.
This is consistent with migrants selecting their state of destination based on low
exports, or could be due to an attenuation bias due to measurement error.
Full results, first stage results and robustness checks are relegated to Appendix
B.2. The positive effects of migrants on exports is robust to PPMLE estimation,
preserving observations with 0 migrants, and using a larger set of countries.
2.3.2 Calibration
I calibrate the model to the 50 US states, the District of Columbia, and 56 coun-
tries, and a composite “Rest of the World” (ROW), for a total of 108 regions.8 Table
2.2 summarizes the parameters and their calibrated value, as well data for the data
shares needed to solve the model (trade, migration and wage shares).
Data sources I use migration data from the World Bank’s Bilateral Migration
Matrix for 2013, and combine it with the American Community Survey (ACS) to
construct measures of migrant stock in every regions. International trade data comes
8The large majority of US trade flows and migrant stock are covered by the 56 countries: the ROW only accounts
for 10% of US exports and 30% of migrant population.
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from the OECD Inter-Country Input-Output table for 2013, and within-US trade
data comes from the Commodity Flow Survey (CFS).9 Wage bill shares are calibrated
using survey data from the ACS for US states, and from other national surveys for
other countries, obtained through IPUMS-International (MPC, 2019). Section B.4
in the Appendix provides additional details on the sources and the exact mapping
between the data and the model objects.
Parameter values For the trade elasticity and the migration elasticity, I take values
from the literature. I set the trade elasticity θ to 4, following Simonovska and Waugh
(2014), and the migration elasticity ε to 2.3 as in Caliendo et al. (2017). For the
elasticity of trade costs to migration, I use my estimate of 0.2 from above, whose
structural interpretation is η × θ, and thus set η = 0.2/θ = 0.05. In Appendix B.5,
I explore different values of elasticities, with no significant differences in the results
interpretation.
2.4 Counterfactual simulations
To quantify the effect of migration, I conduct the following counterfactual: I
increase migration costs to the US uniformly for all foreign countries (κiUS) such
that the migrant share of US population is reduced by 50%. This is similar to
reducing the migrant population shares to that of 1980.10 It is also consistent with
proposed legislation that aim to reduce legal annual immigration flows by half.11
The resulting changes in variables can be interpreted as if the economy moved to a
9See Appendix B.4.2 for a discussion of the data coverage in the CFS, and a robustness check for its limitations.
10In 1980, the share of migrant population in the US was 6.2%. Reducing the migrant population in 2013 (base
year for my analysis) by half would bring the migrant share to around 6.8%.
11While the proposed legislation reduces immigration flows by 50%, there is no concept of flows in the model and I
assume that the reduction in flows would translate in a long-run reduction of migrant stock by half. See the following
link for details of the proposed bill: https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/354
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Table 2.2: Link between the model and the data
Description Value Source
Parameter
ε migration elasticity 2.3 Caliendo et al. (2017)




η = 0.2/θ own estimate
Exogenous object
Ân, B̂in,τ̂in 1 keep constant
κ̂in migration costs uniformly increased for
i /∈ US, n ∈ US, to tar-
get a reduction of 50%
in total migrant stock
living in the US
Data
πmigin , Nin population data ACS, World Bank
πtradein , Xn trade data (including
services)
Census data on state




Θin share of wage bill to mi-









To further understand the role of migration in shaping market access of each state,
I also run three additional counterfactuals for each state: the first increases migration
costs in the particular state only, the second increases migration costs in all other
states except the state of interest, and the third leaves migration costs unchanged but
increases the export trade costs to the level they reach in the main counterfactual.12
These counterfactuals provide an approximate decomposition of the full effect of the
nation-wide increase in migration costs into:
1. A shock to the labor supply and migrant-induced within-state market access in
state s, leaving demand from international migrants in other states unaffected
(outside of general equilibrium forces) and export trade costs unchanged. I
define the wage changes from this counterfactual as the “own-state effect”.
2. A shock to internal market access due to a decrease in demand from international
migrants living in other states, leaving the labor supply and export trade costs
in state s unaffected. I define wage changes from this counterfactual as the
“intra-national market access effect”.
3. A shock to international market access due to the increase in export trade costs.
I define wage changes from this counterfactual as the “international market
access effect”.
2.4.1 Results
I present first the aggregate US-wide results, before turning to the regional impacts
and their decomposition.
12Precisely, I use the value of κ̂iUS , ∀i /∈ US necessary to achieve the 50% reduction in migrant share in the main
counterfactual, and the resulting change in export trade cost d̂ij , ∀i ∈ US, j /∈ US. I construct the first additional
counterfactual by setting κ̂is = κ̂iUS ,∀i /∈ US for state s, and κ̂is′ = 1,∀s′ 6= s, and no effect of migrants on trade
costs (η = 0). The second additional counterfactual uses κ̂is = 1, ∀i /∈ US for state s, and κ̂is′ = κ̂iUS ,∀s′ 6= s, and
no effect of migrants on trade costs (η = 0). The third is constructed using κ̂ij = 1 and τ̂ij = d̂ij .
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Table 2.3: Average changes
Constant Endogenous
trade costs trade costs
% Change in state export costs, 0 3.7
exports weighted (0) (0.16)
% Change in exports 1.56 -4.47
as share of output (0.56) (1.07)
% Change in natives’ welfare -0.01 -0.13
(0.10) (0.09)
Notes: The table shows the percentage changes, after reducing the share of migrants in the US population by half.
Numbers are average across US states, with standard deviation in parenthesis.
Aggregate results Table 2.3 shows the average change in export trade costs across
US states and the average change in exports as share of state output, as well as the
average change in welfare in the US. Standard deviations across states are also shown
in parentheses.
On average, export trade costs faced by US states increase by 3.7%, which is
of similar magnitude as the 4.9% current ad valorem export tariffs faced by US
exporters (WEF, 2016). The average change in welfare is close to 0 when trade costs
are not allowed to react to migrant population, but becomes negative at -0.13% when
export costs increase because of the reduction in migrant population. This underpins
the importance of the trade cost reduction channel of migrants. In fact, exports as
a share of output increase in the first case, as demand moves out of the US, but
decreases in the second case, as the increase in export trade costs is high enough to
offset the geographical shift in demand.
The standard deviation of trade costs changes is low compared to the average
effect. This is because the uniform increase in migration costs leads, to a first order
approximation, to a proportional reduction of migrant population of every country in
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every state, hence affecting trade costs similarly.13 The dispersion of welfare changes
across US states is however of the same order of magnitude as the average effect and
I therefore analyze the geographical dispersion in the next subsection.
Regional heterogeneity This section investigates what drives the heterogenous
response to the drop in migrant population across states, focusing on explaining the
variation in real wage change across US states.14
Figure 2.2 plots the percentage change in a state’s real wage for the main counter-
factual as well as the three additional counterfactuals. The first bar (in blue) displays
the change in real wage for the main counterfactual, the second bar (in grey) dis-
plays the own-state effect (defined as the change in real wage when only own-state
migrant population is reduced), the third bar (in white) displays the intra-national
market access effect (defined as the change in real wage when other-state migrant
population is reduced), and the last bar shows the international market access effect
(defined as the change when only export trade costs are changed). While the sum
of the additional counterfactuals is not exactly identical to the main counterfactual,
it is extremely close to it, so that they can be thought of as a decomposition of the
main counterfactual.15
The average real wage change of −0.16% can thus be decomposed into an own-
state effect of +0.26%, an intra-national market access effect of −0.31 and and in-
13Some states are affected differentially depending on the composition of their migrant population. For example,
almost 10% of Mexican-born population resides in the USA. About half of these move to Mexico in the counterfactual,
thereby increasing labor supply in Mexico and leading to a drop in real wage, which compensates the drop in
attractivity of the US due to the increased migration cost. Hence states with a high share of Mexican migrants will
experience a slightly lower drop in migrant population, leading to a lower increase in trade costs. These effects,
however, are all second-order, which is why the increase in trade costs are fairly homogenous.
14Note that because of migration, the change in state-level real wage is somewhat different from the change in
welfare of the state’s natives. I focus on change in real wages in this section as it is easier to interpret its reaction
to migrant demand and export exposure through the lens of the model. Change in state’s native welfare is highly
correlated with the change in the state’s welfare because the initial share of native population in the state is high
(see equation 2.3).
15The correlation between the sum of the decompositions and the main counterfactual is 0.99, and the average
absolute difference is around 0.002 percentage points.
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Notes: The figure plots the counterfactual real wage change in each state in the main counterfactual and the
three decompositions.
ternational market access effect of −0.11%. The state-level results reveal several
interesting patterns.
First, it is clear that the nationwide reduction of migrant population has hetero-
geneous effects across states, from Vermont’s real wage dropping by around .44% to
New Jersey’s wage increasing by around .20%.
Second, even small state-level wage changes can mask large underlying changes
caused by labor supply reduction or market access. For example, Nevada (NV)’s
real wage barely reacts to the nationwide migrant share reduction. However, if its
migrant population were to decrease leaving the rest of the US’s migrant population
constant, real wage would increase because the drop in labor supply would be larger
than the drop in market access, as illustrated in the positive grey bar. However,
because of its exposure to migrant demand from other states due to trade linkages
with large migrant states such as California, its wage falls when migrants in other
states disappear, as indicated by the negative white bar. Furthermore, the drop in
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international market access due to the increase in export costs depresses the wage
even further, as evidenced by the negative purple bar.
Finally, the size of the intra-national market access effect is larger and more
disperse than the international market access effect, implying that the heterogeneity
across states is mostly driven by internal rather than international market access.
The international component still remains sizable at negative 0.11% on average.
To clearly illustrate the mechanisms at play, Figure 2.3 plots the value of each
decomposition bar against the relevant heuristic measures mentioned in Section 2.2.5.
The left panel plots the own-state effect against the difference between own migrant
share and own migrant demand exposure. As expected, the relationship is positive.
States with a higher migrant share than own-migrant absorption benefit from the
removal of migrants in their state, because their labor supply drops by more than the
demand for their output. The middle panel plots the intra-national market access
effect on exposure to migrants from other states. The relationship is negative, as
states who sell a larger share of their output to migrants in other states experience
a larger decline in market access. Finally the right panel of Figure 2.3 plots the
international market access effect against the export exposure. The relationship is
negative as states with a higher export exposure suffer more from the increase in
trade costs.
2.5 Skill heterogeneity and migrant-native work substitutability
The importance of skills and the imperfect substitutability between migrant and
native workers in determining the effects of migration has long been recognized (e.g.
Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). In this section, I show that the skills shape the effect of
migration on trade costs, but leaves the importance of regional exposure to migrant
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Figure 2.3: Heuristic measures



















































































































(a) Own-state effect (b) Intra-national market access



























































(c) International market access
Notes: The left panel plots the change in real wage in the own-state counterfactual, where only migration
costs to the specific state are increased, against the difference between own-migrant share and own-migrant
demand exposure. The middle panel plots the change in real wage when migration costs in other states increase,
against the exposure to migrants from other states. The right panel plots the change in real wage when only
export costs increase, against export exposure. Own migrant exposure is defined as shmigiXii/Xi, exposure
to demand from other stated is defined as
∑
j 6=i shmigjXij/Xi, and export exposure is defined as XiRW /Xi.
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demand unchanged.
2.5.1 Empirical evidence on skill heterogeneity
To investigate the differential impact of skilled and unskilled migration on trade
costs, I run the same regression as in section 2.3.1, separating high-skill migrants
(defined as migrants with some college level education) and low-skill migrants. The
instrumental variable approach is the same, except for the instrument being com-
puted at the skill level.












where NHis and N
L
is are the number of high- and low-skill migrants from country i
residing in state s. Table 2.4 reports the results of the regression, together with the
pooled results from above for convenience.
The results reveal that high-skill migration is responsible for the positive impact of
migration on exports, with an elasticity of around 0.3, while low-skill migration has no
significant effect. High-skill migrants are probably more likely to perform managerial
tasks or occupy jobs with higher responsibility, where finding new customers is more
common.
The OLS results are upward biased for low-skill migrant and downward biased for
high-skill migrants. This is consistent with low-skill migration taking place towards
states that have lower unobservable migration cost correlated with lower unobserv-
able trade costs, while high-skill migrants target states for which their knowledge
allow them to lower an otherwise higher trade cost.
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Table 2.4: Estimation of the effect of migrants on exports by skill
OLS regression IV regression
log (exports) log (exports) log (exports) log (exports)
log (migrants) 0.152** 0.208***
(0.059) (0.065)
log (HSmig) 0.091* 0.308***
(0.052) (0.105)
log (LSmig) 0.057 -0.056
(0.038) (0.077)
Adjacency X X X X
Distance X X X X
Imp. and exp. FE X X X X
Country clust. SE X X X X
First stage KPF-stat 791 141
N 2511 2511 2511 2511
Notes: Results from estimating equation 2.5, using the instrument described in the text. Standard errors in paren-
thesis, *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01
2.5.2 Model
I modify the model in Section 2.2 to include different skilled and unskilled labor,
as well as imperfect substitutability between migrant and native workers. Details of
the model are relegated to Appendix B.3 and are mostly the same as the model in
Section 2.2. I present the main differences below.
Production There are now four types of labor used for production: migrant and
native, high- and low-skill labor. Low-skill and high-skill labor (LL and LH ) are
measured in efficiency units of labor, with migrant and domestic labor being im-
perfectly substitutable. More precisely, the production function for good j is given
by:















where z(j) is a location-specific idiosyncratic productivity for each good j and ρ is
the elasticity of substitution across skills. The amount of s-skill labor, Ls, is itself a













where λ is the elasticity of substitution across native and migrant labor, Lsd is the
amount of domestic (native) units of labor of skill s and Lsm is the amount of migrant
units of labor of skill s.
Preferences and worker efficiency Workers of skill s born in region i and living in





where Wn is the same CES aggregator of the continuum of goods as in the baseline
model and κsin is a migration cost in term of utils.
Workers supply their endowment of labor inelastically in the location they reside,
but have a different efficiency depending on where they were born and were they
reside. Specifically, worker ω of skill s born in region i and living in region n supplies
bsin(ω) of efficiency units of labor.
Skill level can be either high (s = H) or low (s = L). The efficiency is distributed
according to the following Fréchet distribution:
F sin(b) = e
−Bsinb−ε ,
where ε is the shape parameter governing the dispersion of efficiencies and Bsin is a
location parameter: workers of skill s from region i are in general more efficient in
regions n with higher Bsin.
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Trade costs Consistent with the evidence in section 2.5.1, trade costs depend on
the high and low-skill migration as follows:













if N sin 6= 0, n ∈ US, i /∈ US or opposite
1 otherwise
.
Trade costs are negatively affected by the share of migrants of skill s in the exporter’s
population, but the effect of different skill level is heterogeneous, governed by the
two elasticities ηH and ηL.
The rest of the model follow the quantitative framework in section 2.2, and addi-
tional description of the equilibrium with skill as well as calibration of the parameters
is relegated to Appendix B.3. For the trade elasticity and migration elasticity, the
parameter values are similar to the ones in the main model. Regarding trade cost
elasticities, I set ηH = 0.3/θ and ηL = 0 consistent with the estimates in 2.5.1. Fi-
nally, the elasticity of substitution between skills ρ is set to 1.6 following Katz and
Murphy (1992), and the elasticity of substitution between native and migrant work λ
is set to 20 following Ottaviano and Peri (2012). Alternative calibration is explored
in Appendix B.5.
2.5.3 Counterfactual results
Table 2.5 shows the average change in export trade costs across US states and the
average change in exports as share of state output, as well as the average change in
wages in the US for different skill levels, defined as the native-population weighted
average of wage changes in each state. Standard deviations across states are also
shown in parentheses.
The average change in welfare is negative, at -0.17% and -0.22% for low and
high skill respectively, when trade costs are left constant. Exports as a share of
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Table 2.5: Imperfect substitutability scenario: average changes across US states
Constant Endogenous
trade costs trade costs
% change in state export costs, 0 5.49
exports weighted (0) (0.23)
% change in exports 1.46 -7.14
as share of output (0.60) (1.34)
% change in US low-skill welfare -0.16 -0.34
(0.16) (0.18)
% change in US college welfare -0.20 -0.37
(0.07) (0.07)
Notes: The table shows the percentage changes going from current migrant population in the US to a population of
half. Numbers are weighted average across US states, with standard deviation in parenthesis.
output increase, as demand moves out of the US when the migrants leave the US.
When trade costs are endogenous, export trade costs faced by US states increase
by 5.49% on average, a larger increase than in the results that don’t account for
skill differential, because the elasticity of trade costs on high-skill migrants is higher.
The resulting drop in welfare of low- and high-skill US natives are around 0.34
and 0.37% respectively. The larger drop in average welfare than in the baseline
model is explained by the larger increase in export costs and by the complementarity
between native and foreign labor. Appendix B.5 shows that the changes in welfare
are dampened when the elasticity of substitution between migrants and natives’ labor
is increased.
Regional heterogeneity As for the main counterfactual, I decompose the effect into
an “own-state” reduction of migration an intra-national market access effect, and an
international market access effect. Figure 2.4 displays the total change in real wage
(first bar in blue), the own-state effect (second bar in gray), the intra-national market
73
access effect (third bar in white), and international market access effect (fourth bar
in purple). Subfigure 2.4 shows the response of native low-skill wages, while subfigure
2.4 depicts the reaction of native high-skill wages.
The shock to own-state migrant population, while having a positive impact on
average, is negative in some states, as complementarities induce a lower wage for
native workers after the reduction of migrant labor supply. Both intra- and interna-
tional market access effects are negative, as the negative demand shock affects wages
negatively.
Overall, the skill and native-migrant imperfect substitutability dimensions affect
how the labor supply shock feeds in the economy: it affects the magnitude, and even
sometimes the sign of the own-state effect. The market access effect of reducing
migrant population, however, remains unaffected by these production elasticities.
Table 2.6 makes this point clear by displaying the correlation between the baseline
model and imperfect substitutability model decompositions. The correlation is high
at 0.99 for the internal and international market access effects: these mechanisms
operate through the demand channel and their regional impact are similar regardless
of the production elasticities. The own-migrant effect correlation is lower between
the baseline and imperfect substitutability model, because the production elasticities
λ and ρ affect the reaction of the wage to the increased labor supply.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper shows the impact of migrants on trade market access. Migrants shape
market access through two channels. They change the geographical location of de-
mand, thereby benefiting regions closer to their migration destination, and they
reduce trade frictions, thereby easing access of their host country to their home
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Figure 2.4: Imperfect substitutability scenario: decomposing regional effects





























































































































































































Notes: The figure plots the counterfactual real wage change in each state in the main counterfactual and
the three decompositions, for the model with skills and imperfect substitutability between native and foreign
workers.



















Own effect 0.556 0.552 -0.233
Internal MA 0.991 0.994 0.975
International MA 0.992 0.993 0.998
Notes: The table shows the correlation between the real wage changes resulting from own-migrant removal
(first row), other-states migrant removal (middle row), and increased trade costs (third row). The first column
shows the correlation across states between the wage change in the baseline model and the low-skill wage in the
imperfect substitutability model. The middle column displays the correlation between baseline and high-skill
wages, and the right column displays the correlation between the high- and low-skill wage changes.
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country’s market.
The evidence shows that migrants have a causal impact on exports from their host
state to their home country, particularly so for high-skill migrants. Using a model of
intra- and inter-national trade and migration calibrated to the US states, I show that
a nationwide reduction in migrant population produces heterogeneous responses in
wage through different effects on intra- and inter-national market access. States with
a high exposure to migrants inside the US relative to their own migrant population
are hurt more by the removal of migrants, and those with a high export exposure
are hurt more by the increase in trade costs.
While policy discussions typically emphasize the effect of migrants’ labor supply,
this paper shows that their effect on labor demand through increased market access
is important as well.
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CHAPTER III
The Economics and Politics of Revoking NAFTA
with Raphael A. Auer and Andrei A. Levchenko1
3.1 Introduction
With the onset of the global financial crisis, the longstanding downward trend
in tariffs and other barriers to trade has come to a halt. Recent political events
such as the election of the Trump administration in the US and the British vote
to leave the European Union indicate an acute danger of rising protectionism and
renationalisation of production and consumption. International trade has become
salient in voters’ minds and some parties and politicians profess strong views on the
benefits and costs of particular trade policies. However, in a highly interconnected
world economy with supply chains that cross country borders, who gains and who
loses from trade policies is far from transparent.
Against this backdrop, this paper studies the distributional impacts of one promi-
nent proposed protectionist measure – revoking NAFTA – in the global network of
1Preliminary version of a paper prepared for the 2018 IMF Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference and the
IMF Economic Review.
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input-output trade. To examine the general equilibrium effects of this policy, we
combine the multi-sector, multi-country, multi-factor general equilibrium Ricardian
trade model (e.g. Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Caliendo and Parro, 2015; Levchenko
and Zhang, 2016) with a specific-factors model that generates distributional effects
of trade across sectors (Jones, 1971; Mussa, 1974; Levchenko and Zhang, 2013; Galle
et al., 2017). We calibrate the model to the global matrix of intermediate and final
goods trade from the 2016 edition of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD)
and WIOD’s Socioeconomic Accounts (Timmer et al., 2015). We then simulate a
scenario in which NAFTA is dismantled. In particular, this counterfactual entails a
rise in tariffs from the current NAFTA-negotiated ones to the Most-Favored Nation
(MFN) level, as well as an increase in non-tariff barriers in both goods and service
sectors estimated by Felbermayr et al. (2017).
We first assess the economic impact of this policy at the level of US congressional
districts, Canadian provinces, and Mexican states. To do so, we combine the sector-
country-specific real wage changes resulting from our general equilibrium model with
information on employment shares in those geographical units. We then analyze the
political dimension of this policy by correlating the economic outcomes with recent
voting patterns. Since the threat to revoke NAFTA comes from the United States,
we focus on this country and examine in particular the Trump vote shares in the 2016
election. This exercise sheds light on whether districts that voted for the arguably
most protectionist candidate stand to benefit or lose disproportionately from this
particular potential trade policy.
Our results can be summarized as follows. The total welfare change from revoking
NAFTA would be −0.22% for the United States, −1.8% for Mexico, and −2.2%
for Canada. These aggregate numbers are an order of magnitude smaller than the
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distributional effects across sectors. Sectoral real wage changes range from −2.72%
to 2.25% for the US, from −16.85% to 9.45% for Mexico, and from −14.06% to 1.71%
for Canada. Because sectoral employment is unevenly distributed across geographic
locations, there are considerable distributional consequences across space as well. In
the United States, average wage changes range from −0.41% in Ohio’s 4th district
to 0.08% in Texas’ 11th district, with a cross-district standard deviation of 0.05%.
Average wage changes range from −3.35% to −1.35% across Canadian provinces and
from −4.11% to −0.85% across Mexican states. Thus, both the aggregate welfare
changes, and the extent of distributional impacts are significantly greater in Canada
and Mexico in percentage terms.
Turning to the relationship with political outcomes, we find that if anything there
is a negative correlation between the real wage change in a congressional district
and the Trump vote share. Though dismantling or renegotiating NAFTA was a
prominent pillar of the Trump presidential campaign, Trump-voting districts would
experience systematically greater wage decreases if NAFTA disappeared.2
To better understand this somewhat surprising pattern, we construct three simple,
heuristic measures of trade exposure to NAFTA at the US congressional district
level. The first is a measure of import exposure to the NAFTA partner countries,
defined as the employment share-weighted average of sectoral imports from NAFTA
partners in total US absorption. Intuitively, import exposure to NAFTA partners
is high in a congressional district if it has high employment shares in sectors with
greater import competition from those countries. All else equal, we should expect
wages to rise the most in locations that in the current regime compete most closely
with Canada and Mexico. The second is an export orientation measure, which is
2The exception to this empirical regularity are congressional districts with a large share of Mining and quarrying
in employment, such as the Texas 11th congressional district, or the state of Wyoming.
79
the employment share-weighted average of sectoral exports to NAFTA partners in
total US output. Intuitively, we should expect locations with higher employment
shares in NAFTA-export-oriented industries to lose disproportionately from NAFTA
revocation. Finally, the third measure is NAFTA imported input intensity, defined
as the employment-weighted share of spending on NAFTA inputs in total input
spending. We should expect congressional districts that rely on NAFTA inputs to
experience relatively larger wage decreases when NAFTA is revoked, although this
prediction is contingent on the relevant substitution elasticities.
Taken individually, the bilateral relationships between all three heuristics and
model-implied wage changes are negative and statistically significant. This is in-
tuitive for two measures – export orientation and imported input intensity – but
counterintuitive for import exposure, as it implies that congressional districts most
exposed to direct import competition actually see larger real wage reductions when
protection increases following a dismantling of NAFTA.
At the same time, the statistical association between all three of these heuristics
and the Trump vote share is positive and significant. This is intuitive for the import
exposure measure – locations suffering the most from import competition voted more
for Trump – but less so for the other two measures, as locations exporting to NAFTA
or sourcing inputs from NAFTA should foresee wage decreases if NAFTA is done
away with.
The apparent mystery is resolved by the fact that the correlation between the three
heuristics is extremely high: the export orientation has a 0.92 correlation with import
exposure, and a 0.86 correlation with imported input intensity. Less surprisingly,
imported input intensity has a 0.95 correlation with import exposure. Thus, the
picture that emerges from this exercise is first and foremost one of differences across
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locations in the overall level of integration with NAFTA countries. Places that suffer
the most from NAFTA import competition are also overwhelmingly those that export
to NAFTA and use NAFTA intermediates.
It is thus not surprising that the locations overall more open to NAFTA trade
experience larger net welfare losses: effectively, a revocation of NAFTA represents a
relatively greater reduction in trade openness for those locations. We do show, how-
ever, that these locations are also the ones that voted systematically more for Trump.
This exercise underscores the need for a model-based quantitative assessment that
takes into account multiple import and export linkages and general equilibrium ad-
justments. Heuristic measures of import competition that have been used in other
contexts (e.g. Autor et al., 2013, and the large literature that followed) would be mis-
leading as to which locations would stand to lose the most from NAFTA revocation,
and how the distributional effects of NAFTA correlate with Trump vote. Indeed,
while the bivariate relationships between all three of the heuristic measures and real
wage changes or Trump vote all have the same sign, the conditional relationships
all have the expected signs: when controlling for export orientation and imported
input intensity, the locations with greater NAFTA import exposure experience rel-
ative wage gains from NAFTA rollback. Similarly, controlling for import exposure,
districts with greater export orientation actually tended to vote less for Trump.
Our work follows the tradition of quantitative assessments of trade policy, going
back to the first-generation CGE literature (see, among many others, Deardorff and
Stern, 1990; Harrison et al., 1997; Hertel, 1997). More recent contributions extend
the Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework to study the welfare effects of NAFTA (e.g.
Caliendo and Parro, 2015), the effect of the UK leaving the European Union (Dhingra
et al., 2017), or greater potential US protectionism (Felbermayr et al., 2017). Our
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two main contributions are (i) to bring to the fore the distributional aspects of trade
policies, and (ii) to systematically relate those distributional aspects to the variation
in political support for the presidential candidate that proposed implementing these
policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 lays out the quantitative
framework used in the analysis, and Section 3.3 describes the data. Section 3.4
presents the real wage and income changes following the revocation of NAFTA,
and Section 3.5 relates those to voting patterns in the US. Section 3.6 presents
some extensions and robustness checks, and Section 3.7 concludes. Details of data,
calibration, and model solution are collected in the Appendix.
3.2 Quantitative framework
The world is composed of N countries denoted by m, n, and k, and J sectors
denoted by i and j. Each sector produces a continuum of goods. The factors of
production are capital (K) and three types of labor: high- (LH), medium- (LM),
and low-skill (LL). Capital and labor are perfectly mobile across goods within a
sector, but immobile across sectors (Jones, 1971; Mussa, 1974). This assumption
means that the results should be interpreted as the short-run effects of the policy
experiments we simulate.3 Micro evidence shows that following trade shocks, worker
mobility across sectors is quite limited (e.g. Artuç et al., 2010; Dix-Carneiro, 2014),
and thus our model provides a good approximation to the factor adjustment in the
short run. Country n, sector j are endowed with LH,jn units of high-skilled labor,
LM,jn units of medium-skilled labor, LL,jn units of low-skilled labor, and Kjn units
of capital.
3Section 3.6.1 presents the results when factors are mobile across sectors, a scenario intended to capture the
long-run outcomes.
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Preferences and final demand Utility is identical and homothetic across agents in











where pjn is the price of sector j composite good, and I(ι) is ι’s income. Income
in this economy comes from labor and capital earnings, tariff revenue, and a trade
deficit in the form of a transfer to n from the rest of the world (which will be negative

















where ws,jn and rjn are the wage rate for s-skilled labor and the return to capital
in sector j in country n, Tn total tariff revenue in country n, and Dn is the trade
deficit. Since utility is Cobb-Douglas, this demand system admits a representative
consumer, and thus final consumption spending in each sector is a constant fraction
of aggregate income. Denote the economywide final consumption on sector j goods
in country n by Yjn. Then:
pjnYjn = ξjnIn.










In the quantitative implementation below, agents ι will be differentiated by which
sectoral factor endowments they own, and thus we will be computing income changes
for medium-skilled workers in the apparel sector, for example.
Technology and market structure Output in each sector j is produced competitively
using a CES production function that aggregates a continuum of varieties q ∈ [0, 1]










where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution across varieties q, Qjn is the total
output of sector j in country n, and Qjn(q) is the amount of variety q that is used
in production in sector j and country n. The composite Qjn is non-tradeable, and is
split between final consumption and intermediate usage. Individual varieties Qjn(q)
are tradeable subject to physical trade costs and policy trade restrictions, and can


























where zjn(q) denotes variety-specific productivity, kjn(q) and ls,jn(q) denote inputs of
capital and s-skilled labor, and mijn denotes the intermediate input from sector i used
in production sector-j goods in country n. The value-added-based labor intensity is
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given by αs,jn for skill type s, while the share of value added in total output is given
by βjn. Both of these vary by sector and country. The weights on inputs from other
sectors, γijn, vary by output industry j as well as input industry i and by country n.
Productivity zjn(q) for each q ∈ [0, 1] in each sector j is equally available to
all agents in country n, and product and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
Following Eaton and Kortum (2002, henceforth EK), the productivity draw zjn(q)
























The production of a unit of good q in sector j in country n requires z−1jn (q) input
bundles, and thus the cost of producing one unit of good q is bjn/zjn(q). International
trade is subject to iceberg costs: in order for one unit of good q produced in sector j
to arrive at country n from country m, dj,mn > 1 units of the good must be shipped
(in describing bilateral flows, we follow the convention that the first subscript denotes
source, the second destination). We normalize dj,nn = 1 for each country n in each
sector j. Note that the trade costs will vary by destination pair and by sector, and
in general will not be symmetric: dj,nm need not equal dj,mn.
In addition to non-policy trade frictions dj,mn, there are two policy barriers to
trade: an ad valorem tariff τj,mn that is paid at the border, and an ad valorem non-
tariff barrier ηj,mn > 1, that distorts trade but does not result in any government
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revenue. The total trade cost is thus given by κj,mn = dj,mnηj,mn(1 + τj,mn).
Goods markets are competitive, and thus prices equal marginal costs. The price





Buyers of each good q in sector j in country n will select to buy from the cheapest















This value summarizes, for country n, the access to production technologies in sector
j. Its value will be higher if in sector j, country n’s trading partners have high
productivity (Ajm) or low cost (bjm ). It will also be higher if the trade costs that
country n faces in this sector are low. Standard steps lead to the familiar result that
the probability of importing good q from country m, πj,mn is equal to the share of











In addition, the price of good j aggregate in country n is simply











1−ε , with Γ denoting the Gamma function.
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Equilibrium and market clearing A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a
set of goods prices {pjn}j=1,...,Jn=1,...,N , factor prices {ws,jn}
j=1,...,J
n=1,...,N for s = H,M,L and







such that (i) consumers maximize utility; (ii) firms maximize profits; and (iii) all
markets clear.
The market clearing condition for sector j aggregate in country n is given by










Total expenditure in sector j, country n, pjnQjn, is the sum of domestic final expen-

































Finally, since all factors of production are immobile across sectors, sectoral skill-















Formulation in changes Following Dekle et al. (2008), we express the model in terms
of gross proportional changes relative to the baseline equilibrium and the baseline
equilibrium observables. For any baseline value of a variable x, denote by a prime
its counterfactual value following some change in parameters, and by a “hat” the
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gross change in a variable between a baseline level and a counterfactual: x̂ ≡ x′/x.
The shock we will consider is an increase in tariffs τj,mn and non-tariff barriers ηj,mn
























where SLs,in, SKin, and SDn are the initial shares of s-skill labor income in sector
i, capital income in sector i, and the trade deficit, respectively. The market clearing
condition (3.5) becomes:











The factor market clearing conditions become:






































(3.13) κ̂j,mn = dj,mnη̂j,mn
(1 + τ ′j,mn)
(1 + τ j,mn)
.
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Equations (3.8)-(3.15) are solved for all the price, wage, and quantity changes be-
tween the baseline equilibrium and the counterfactual. The model is solved using
the algorithm described in Appendix C.1.
3.3 Data
This section describes the sources of our trade, input-output, trade policy, and
voting data.
The 2016 release of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD) is our main data
source. It contains data on trade flows, intermediate input usage, and final con-
sumption at the sectoral level. The socio-economic accounts compiled by the WIOD
also contain data on labor and capital share in value added. Labor is broken down
into three skill levels. A low-skilled worker is defined by the WIOD as one with at
most some secondary education. A medium-skilled worker has a complete secondary
education. A high-skilled worker has some tertiary education or more. We use the
latest year available, which is 2014.4 The WIOD and its construction are described
in detail in Timmer et al. (2015). We combine some sectors with too many zeros, and
add Turkey, Russia, Luxembourg, and Malta to the composite “Rest of the World”
4The latest WIOD release does not include worker breakdowns by skill. For that information, we use the previous
(2011) WIOD release, with skill-specific sectoral labor data pertaining to 2009.
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region. The resulting dataset consists of 40 countries and 38 sectors. Tables C.1 and
C.2 in the Appendix provide a list of countries and sectors.
To get a sense of the importance of input and final goods trade among the NAFTA
countries, Table 3.1 reports aggregate intermediate and final spending shares accord-
ing to WIOD. The left panel reports the share of spending on intermediates from
the country in the row of the table in the total intermediate spending in the country
in the column. Thus, the US sources 89.7% of all intermediates it uses from itself,
1.8% from Canada, and 1% from Mexico. The importance of the US for Canada
and Mexico is predictably larger. The US supplies 12.1% of all intermediates used
in Canada, and 15.1% of intermediates used in Mexico. The right panel presents
the corresponding shares in final consumption spending. The importance of NAFTA
countries in each other’s final goods spending is lower, with Canada and Mexico
supplying 0.6% and 0.8% of US final consumption spending, and the US supplying
6.2% and 3.5% of final consumption of Canada and Mexico, respectively.5
Table 3.1: NAFTA market shares
Intermediate spending Final consumption spending
Canada Mexico United States Canada Mexico United States
Canada .783 .007 .018 .876 .002 .006
Mexico .006 .716 .010 .006 .914 .008
United States .121 .151 .897 .062 .035 .943
Notes: This table reports the share of input spending (left panel) and final spending (right panel) in the column
country coming from the row country. The columns do not add up to 1 because of imports from non-NAFTA
countries.
Location-specific employment data come from the U.S. Census Bureau (year
2015), Statistics Canada (year 2015) and the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y
Geografia (year 2014). These are provided at the sectoral level following the NAICS
5de Gortari (2019) shows that according to the Mexican firm-level customs data, the input linkages between
Mexico and the US are in fact greater than what is implied by the WIOD, and that a NAFTA trade war would have
even larger negative consequences. By using WIOD, our approach is thus conservative and if anything understates
the overall impact of NAFTA revocation.
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classification. We convert these to ISIC Rev. 4 using the correspondence table from
the Census Bureau. Employment shares by skill for the US at the county level come
from the U.S. Census Bureau (2016). For the US, we convert county-level data to
congressional district by using the Census Bureau’s mapping. We do not have break-
downs of location-specific employment by both skill level and industry. Finally, data
on election results at the congressional district level have been compiled by Daily
Kos Elections.
At the national level, the sectors in which the bulk of US employment is currently
found have at best weak direct connections to NAFTA countries. The left panel of
Figure 3.1 plots US employment at the sector level against the share of intermediate
spending sourced from the NAFTA countries. There is a broad negative relationship:
the sectors with the greatest NAFTA input spending shares tend to not have much
US employment. The right panel plots employment against the share of output
exported to NAFTA countries. Here, there are essentially two groups of sectors:
the group with a relatively high export intensity to NAFTA and low overall US
employment, and sectors that export virtually nothing to NAFTA but have higher
employment. The figure conveys that the largest US sectors by employment are
(relatively) non-tradeable services. The top 3 sectors in terms of US employment are
“Human health and social work activities,” “Retail trade, except of motor vehicles
and motorcycles,” and “Accommodation and food service activities.”
We use the 2014 tariff data for Canada, Mexico and the US from the World Bank’s
WITS database.6 We set the Canadian, Mexican, and US tariffs τj,mn on imports
from all the countries in the sample to the current effectively applied tariff rates.
The NAFTA revocation counterfactual tariffs τ ′j,mn are then set to the Most Favored
6We extract tariff data directly at the ISIC Rev. 3 sectoral level, and use a correspondence to ISIC Rev. 3.1,
then ISIC Rev. 4, to match it with the WIOD data classification.
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Share of total input spending coming from Canada and Mexico



















































0 .05 .1 .15
Share of exports to Canada and Mexico in sectoral output
Employment and NAFTA export share
Notes: The left panel depicts the US sectoral employment against the share of total input spending in a sector that
is sourced from Canada and Mexico. The right panel depicts the US sectoral employment against the share of total
output exported to Canada and Mexico. The sector key is in Appendix Table C.2.
Nation (MFN) for the NAFTA country pairs. The NAFTA members’ import tariffs
on the rest of the countries do not change in the counterfactual.
Estimates of non-tariff trade barrier (NTB) changes in case of rollback of NAFTA
come from Felbermayr et al. (2017). Those authors fit a standard gravity model
on bilateral trade flows by industry. In addition to the usual gravity controls, the
authors also include a NAFTA dummy. If the NAFTA dummy is positive, it implies
that trade is higher than predicted among NAFTA countries conditional on other
observables. The procedure interprets this finding as lower NTBs among the NAFTA
countries due to NAFTA being in place. Under the assumption that this positive
unexplained effect of NAFTA goes away if NAFTA is revoked, Felbermayr et al.
(2017) compute the rise in NTBs as the increase in trade costs required for trade to
fall by the amount of the estimated NAFTA dummy in each industry. According to
this procedure, in a small number of sectors NTBs will actually fall as a result of
revoking NAFTA. Since this appears implausible, we set the NTB change to zero in
instances where the regression model predicts them to fall if NAFTA is revoked.
Figure 3.2 presents the changes in tariffs and NTBs that we assume would occur if
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NAFTA were revoked, expressed in percentage points (Appendix Table C.3 reports
the precise numbers). Since we assume that Canada and Mexico would receive MFN
treatment if NAFTA disappeared, the tariff changes that would actually occur are by
and large in single digit percentage points. The inferred NTB changes are both larger
on average, and more broad-based, affecting also a number of service sectors in which
tariffs are zero. It is plausible that a revocation of NAFTA will be accompanied by
a general deterioration of the relationship between the countries, and that the NTBs
will rise in a wide range of sectors.
Figure 3.2:




















































































































































































































































































































































NTB baseline Canada Mexico
Notes: This figure reports the change in sectoral tariffs on Mexico and Canada, and the change in the NTBs
imposed by the US on Mexico and Canada, if NAFTA is revoked, expressed in percentage points. “(M)” denotes a
manufacturing sector.
At the same time, the NTB changes reported in Figure 3.2 are inferred from
observed variation in trade flows, rather than measured directly. Direct measurement
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of NTBs is not feasible. To our knowledge, the only comprehensive NTB database
is compiled by UNCTAD, and contains count measures of the number of NTBs in
place by sector and country pair. We collected these data and compared the number
of NTBs among the NAFTA countries with the number of NTBs that the NAFTA
countries impose on non-NAFTA trading partners. It is indeed the case that the
within-NAFTA number of NTBs is systematically lower than the number imposed
by NAFTA countries on non-NAFTA economies. We computed the bilateral sectoral
change in the number of NTBs within NAFTA if each NAFTA country went from
the observed number of NTBs to the average that it imposes on the rest of the world.
In this exercise, we assumed that after the lower NTBs due to NAFTA are phased
out, each NAFTA country treats its NAFTA partners with the same level of NTBs
that it imposes on the rest of the world, in each sector. The correlation between
the implied change in the number of NTBs and the ad valorem NTB change from
Felbermayr et al. (2017) in Figure 3.2 is 0.23 for the US-Mexico NTBs and 0.36 for
the US-Canada NTBs. Given the significant caveats associated with simply using the
number of NTBs as a measure of their severity, the positive correlation is reassuring
that there is some informational content in the NTB values inferred from trade flows
and used in the baseline.
Nonetheless, given the large amount of uncertainly surrounding the NTB numbers,
throughout we report the results under two additional assumptions. First, we assume
that the NTBs don’t change following the dismantling of NAFTA, and only tariffs
do. This is the most conservative treatment of NTBs, resulting in far smaller overall
trade cost increases from dismantling NAFTA. The second alternative we implement
is to jettison the sectoral variation in NTB changes, and simply apply a uniform
increase in NTBs that is equal to the average change across sectors implied by the
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Felbermayr et al. (2017) numbers. This amounts to a 9.62% uniform increase in
NTBs when NAFTA is revoked.
3.4 Quantitative results
3.4.1 Calibration
All parameters except the trade elasticity θ can be calibrated directly from the
WIOD data. All numbers in the WIOD data are in basic prices and therefore ex-
tariff. One cell in the the WIOD database is Mij,mn, the exports from country
m, sector i to country n, sector j, where j could be j = C the final consumption.
Denoting by Mj,mn =
∑J
i=1Mji,mn+MjC,mn the total WIOD value of good j exported





























































where skill-specific labor revenue and value added come from the WIOD Socio-
Economic Accounts.
In the baseline we set the trade elasticity θ = 5, a common value in the quantita-
tive trade literature (e.g. Costinot and Rodŕıguez-Clare, 2014). Section 3.6.2 assesses
the robustness of the results to alternative θ’s.
3.4.2 Sectoral and aggregate effects
Figure 3.3 reports the change in the real wage for each sector following the full re-
vocation of NAFTA. As discussed above, we present three scenarios for NTB changes:
(i) baseline depicted in Figure 3.2; (ii) no NTB changes (tariff changes only), and
(iii) uniform NTB changes.
The real wage change is simply the change in the sectoral wage divided by the
consumption price index, expressed in net terms: ŵs,jn/P̂n− 1. Note that the Cobb-
Douglas production function with immobile factors implies that the proportional
wage changes are the same across skill types (see equation 3.10), and thus there are
no distributional effects across skills within a sector. Section 3.6.1 analyzes instead
a model with mobile factors of production, in which the distributional effects are
instead across skill types. US sectors experience a range of wage changes from a
2.2% increase in the mining and quarrying sector to a 2.7% decline in the coke and
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petroleum sector. The large majority of sectors experience wage decreases, with 7
sectors, all in manufacturing, seeing reductions in excess of 1%. With unchanged
NTBs, wage decreases are much smaller on average, as would be expected since this
scenario involved much smaller trade cost increases. In the United States, overall
the uniform NTB case is quite highly correlated with the baseline, with the notable
difference for the outlier sectors, where the uniform NTB scenario implies changes
smaller in absolute terms. In Canada and Mexico, the range of sectoral wage changes
is much greater. Both Mexico and Canada have sectors that experience wage reduc-
tions in excess of 10%.
In all three countries, the employment-weighted average wage changes, depicted
by the horizontal lines in Figure 3.3, are negative in all three scenarios. The numbers
are in the first column of Table 3.2. The average wage fall in the US is an order of
magnitude smaller than in Mexico and Canada in all scenarios. However, when com-
puting aggregate welfare changes, we must take into account changes in the capital
income and tariff revenue. Proportional changes in capital income are the same as
wage income in our framework. Adding tariff revenue, the second column of Table
3.2 reports the overall welfare changes. The US loses 0.22% from the dismantling of
NAFTA in the baseline scenario. Canadian and Mexican losses are about ten times
larger in proportional terms at around −2%. The numbers are quite similar under
a uniform NTB change. When only tariffs change, the US is indifferent, whereas
Canadian and Mexican welfare fall by 0.06% and 0.25% respectively.
Though proportional changes are smaller in the US, it bears the largest dollar
losses from dismantling NAFTA, at about US$40 billion, as reported in the last
column. Canada is a close second at US$36 billion, and Mexico at US$22. Our
exercise implies that relative price levels (real exchange rates) also move, with the
97





























































































































































































































































































































































Tariff and NTB baseline Tariff only





























































































































































































































































































































































Tariff and NTB baseline Tariff only






























































































































































































































































































































































Tariff and NTB baseline Tariff only
Tariff and uniform NTB
Notes: This Figure depicts sectoral real wage changes due to revocation of NAFTA. Horizontal lines denote the
employment-weighted average wage change for the baseline (solid line), tariff only (grey line) and tariff and uniform
NTB scenarios (dashed line). “(M)” denotes a manufacturing sector.
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Table 3.2: Employment weighted average wage and total welfare changes
Real wage change, % Total welfare change, % in bn. US$
Tariff and NTB baseline
Canada -1.67 -2.15 -36.20
Mexico -1.79 -1.81 -22.07
United States -0.27 -0.22 -39.47
Tariff only
Canada -0.37 -0.06 -1.08
Mexico -0.99 -0.25 -3.06
United States -0.05 -0.00 -0.20
Tariff and uniform NTB
Canada -2.14 -2.02 -33.95
Mexico -3.10 -2.03 -24.80
United States -0.24 -0.22 -38.79
Notes: This table reports the aggregate real wage changes and the total welfare changes, in percentage points
and in billion US$, for the NAFTA countries under the three NAFTA revocation scenarios.
US dollar appreciating by 2.3% against the Mexican peso, and by 1.2% against the
Canadian dollar in real terms. Table 3.3 presents the percentage changes in trade
volume from the rollback of NAFTA relative to world GDP. As expected, NAFTA
countries tend to trade less with each other and substitute towards other countries. In
the baseline scenario, the fall in NAFTA trade volume is quite large. For example,
U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico would fall by 36.9% and 41.8% respectively.
When only tariffs change, the changes are smaller but still sizeable, at around 8%
and 17.7%.
3.4.3 Geographic distribution
We now move on to the geographic distribution of relative gains and losses. To this
end, we aggregate county-level sectoral employment to obtain sectoral employment
shares in each congressional district. Then, we construct the weighted average real
wage change in a district by applying the sectoral wage changes to district-level
sectoral employment shares. In Canada and Mexico, we use province- and state-
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Table 3.3: Percentage change in NAFTA country trade volumes due to a full rollback of NAFTA
Tariff and NTB baseline
Source
Destination Canada Mexico United States Other Total
Canada 0.10 -23.49 -36.91 2.03 -3.25
Mexico -41.14 -0.34 -41.84 -2.23 -4.14
United States -36.50 -33.90 0.49 2.13 -0.12
Other 11.58 16.39 0.09 0.19 0.22
Total -3.23 -4.13 -0.12 0.22 0.03
Tariff only
Source
Destination Canada Mexico United States Other Total
Canada 0.40 -3.70 -8.01 1.78 -0.28
Mexico -14.91 0.96 -17.72 0.99 -0.67
United States -5.60 -11.83 0.09 0.08 -0.07
Other 0.45 1.49 0.35 0.02 0.03
Total -0.28 -0.67 -0.08 0.03 -0.01
Tariff and NTB average
Source
Destination Canada Mexico United States Other Total
Canada 0.41 -23.83 -38.01 6.19 -2.79
Mexico -44.54 -0.40 -45.94 -0.82 -4.43
United States -32.27 -34.95 0.43 1.46 -0.18
Other 7.60 13.61 0.81 0.20 0.23
Total -2.78 -4.42 -0.18 0.23 0.03
Notes: This table reports the percentage changes in trade volume between NAFTA countries and other countries
relative to world GDP.
level sectoral employment shares, respectively. Let c subscript locations, and let ωjc
be the share of sector j employment in total district c employment. The mean real










Note that we are implicitly assuming that within each country, there are no technol-
ogy differences and there is costless trade in goods, which equalizes sectoral wages
across locations. Thus, our distributional effects across locations are driven purely by
sectoral composition differences, and not by differences in wages in the same sector
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across geographic areas within a country.
Figure 3.4 depicts the average real wage changes following the revocation of
NAFTA, by geographical region. Darker shades denote larger wage reductions. The
first distinctive feature of the figure is that the location-specific real wage changes
are overwhelmingly negative throughout North America. Second, the systematically
darker colors are outside of the United States: as reported above, wage reductions are
greater in Canada and Mexico. The figure highlights the pervasiveness of average
wage reductions geographically in Canada and Mexico: though individual sectors
sometimes experience wage increases, no region in Canada or Mexico sees real wage
gains.
Figure 3.5 zooms in on the United States. In the eastern portion of the country,
there are two distinct darker bands in the upper Midwest and the South. The
lightest hues (smallest wage decreases) are in mining areas of Texas, West Virginia,
and Wyoming.













% change in real wage
Notes: This figure depicts the average wage changes by geographic region in North America.
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% change in real wage
Notes: This figure depicts the average wage changes by congressional district in the United States.
3.5 Political correlates of the local economic impact
The quantitative assessment above establishes that the revocation of NAFTA has
distributional consequences: real wage changes differ across sectors and geographic
locations. This section analyzes the political dimension by correlating the geographic
variation in real wage changes with recent voting outcomes. Since proposals to revoke
NAFTA originate from the United States, we focus on this country.
3.5.1 Correlation with Trump vote share
Figure 3.6 presents the scatterplots of the real wage changes due to revocation of
NAFTA against the vote share of the then Republican Party presidential nominee
Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election (henceforth “Trump vote share”).
The left panels shows the scatterplots at the congressional district level, and the
right panels at the state level. At the district level, the slope of the relationship is
negative. It is not significant in the baseline, but becomes significant in the other two
scenarios. Looking closer, in the baseline the negative relationship is substantially
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attenuated by districts with a heavy presence of mining and quarrying, such as Texas
11th district (encompassing central Texas and eastern Texas cities of Midland and
Odessa), the state of Wyoming (a single Congressional district), and West Virginia
3rd (roughly the southern half of the state). Since mining and quarrying experiences
a large change in NTBs in the baseline, these districts are relatively better off from
the policy change, and voted heavily for Trump. Dropping just 2 districts (out of
435) with the highest mining and quarrying employment shares renders the negative
bilateral relationship significant at the 1% level. All in all, with the possible exception
of heavily mining and quarrying areas, Trump-voting congressional districts would
experience systematically larger wage decreases if NAFTA is revoked.
The right side of Figure 3.6 depicts these relationships at the state level. This
might be thought of as corresponding to voting for the president and the US Senate.
Under the NTB baseline, the slope is positive but not significant. Looking closer
at the plot, it is clear that the slope is once again influenced by mining states such
as Wyoming, North Dakota, and West Virginia, that voted for Trump but would
lose relatively less from the revocation of NAFTA. In the upper left part of the plot
are states in the South and the Midwest that voted for Trump but would be hurt
the most by NAFTA revocation, with the top 5 largest wage reductions being in
Wisconsin, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, and Ohio. The two alternative NTB scenarios
yield a negative slope: Trump-voting states are hurt relatively more by revoking
NAFTA.
Appendix Table C.4 shows the top and bottom 10 US congressional districts in
terms of mean real wage change. The second column also shows the mean change in
real wage and tariff revenue. Under the assumption of uniformly distributed tariff
revenue, this can be computed as IWTjn = wjnLjn + sjnTn , where sjn is the share
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Figure 3.6: Real wage changes and 2016 Trump vote share
Congressional district level State level


























































































































































































































































































































































































































-.4 -.3 -.2 -.1 0 .1


























































-.3 -.2 -.1 0




























































































































































































































































































































































































































-.15 -.1 -.05 0


























































-.08 -.06 -.04 -.02
Average real wage change (in %) 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































-.4 -.3 -.2 -.1


























































-.3 -.25 -.2 -.15 -.1
Average real wage change (in %) 
Notes: This figure depicts the scatterplots of the average real wage change from revoking NAFTA and the 2016
Trump vote share by congressional district (left side) and state (right side), along the OLS fit. The boxes report the
coefficient, robust standard error, and the R2 of the bivariate regression.











3.5.2 Political outcomes and heuristic measures of trade exposure to NAFTA
To better understand the patterns documented above, we next construct heuristic
measures of trade exposure to NAFTA and correlate them with the real wage changes
and voting patterns. We use three simple observable measures, intended to capture at
an intuitive level some of the main driving forces behind the geographic distribution
of losses. The specific-factors model delivers the intuition that factors employed in
import-competing sectors should benefit from a uniform increase in trade barriers,
and sectors with an export orientation should lose. In a model with input-output
linkages, factors in a sector employing imported inputs might lose, although that
prediction depends on the substitution elasticities in production and demand.
Thus, at the sector level, we define import penetration as the share of imports





where, as before, pjnQjn is the total US spending (absorption) in an industry. Define














where INTERMIMPORTSNAFTAj is the value of intermediate imports from the
NAFTA countries, and INTERMUSEj is total spending on intermediate inputs for
sector j.




















Thus, a congressional district has a high import exposure, for example, if it has high
employment shares in sectors with high import penetration from NAFTA countries,
and similarly for other measures.
The top row of Figure 3.7 presents the scatterplot of the real wage change due
to the revocation of NAFTA against import exposure (left panel), export orienta-
tion (center panel) and imported input intensity (right panel). All three measures
have statistically significant negative correlation with the real wage change. This is
intuitive in the case of two of the measures: NAFTA export-oriented districts and
those that import a lot of NAFTA inputs should lose more from dismantling NAFTA.
However, the relationship is also negative for import exposure, which is not intuitive,
as locations that compete with NAFTA imports should benefit in relative terms if
NAFTA disappeared.
The bottom row reports the bivariate relationships between these three measures
and the Trump vote share. All three are positive and significant. This time, the im-
port exposure measure delivers “intuitive” results, as the NAFTA import-competing
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locations voted more for Trump. But evidently so did those that export a lot to
NAFTA countries, or use more NAFTA inputs.
This apparent incoherence is resolved by observing that the three heuristic mea-
sures are highly correlated among themselves. Import exposure has a 0.92 correlation
with export orientation, and a 0.95 correlation with imported input intensity. Export
orientation has a 0.86 correlation with imported input intensity.
The picture that emerges is that US congressional districts differ systematically
in their overall trade openness with NAFTA. Locations that compete with NAFTA
imports are also the ones that export the most to NAFTA, and use most NAFTA
inputs. For these areas, a dismantling of NAFTA represents a larger fall in trade
openness compared to locations not engaged with NAFTA, and thus larger real
income falls. These are also the locations that on average voted for Trump.
This discussion shows how misleading it can be to rely on simple heuristic mea-
sures, especially in isolation. Looking at the strong positive correlation between
the widely used import exposure index and the Trump vote share may lead one to
conclude that revoking NAFTA does indeed correspond to the economic interests of
Trump-voting districts. However, it turns out that the districts with a high import-
exposure level are also systematically different along other pertinent dimensions, such
as export orientation.
Altogether, the patterns imply that districts with higher import exposure would
actually lose systematically more from revoking NAFTA. To further illustrate this
point, Table 3.4 shows results of a regression of the real wage changes and vote
shares on the three heuristic measures. Columns 1-3 report the regressions under-
lying the bivariate plots in Figure 3.7. Column 4 uses all three heuristics together.
Now, the export orientation and imported input intensity still have same the “intu-
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itive” sign, but the import exposure indicator switches sign and thus also becomes
intuitive. Controlling for export orientation and imported input intensity, locations
with greater NAFTA import exposure experience relatively positive (less negative)
wage changes from revoking NAFTA. Columns 5 through 8 repeat the exercise for
the Trump vote share. Here again, when all three heuristics are included together,
the sign on the import exposure coefficient is unchanged and remains intuitive, but
the sign on the export orientation switches in the expected direction: controlling
for import exposure, districts with higher NAFTA export orientation votes less for
Trump.
3.6 Extensions and robustness
3.6.1 Mobile factors
All of the above analysis assumes that factors are immobile across sectors, and
thus is meant to capture the short-run effects. In this section, we instead allow
factors to be mobile across sectors, as is more standard in multi-sector trade models.
Since cross-sectoral factor movements are subject to large frictions even at multi-year
horizons (Artuç et al., 2010; Dix-Carneiro, 2014), this exercise is meant to capture
the long-run effects. Note that in this environment, factor market clearing ensures
that factor prices are the same in all sectors, and thus there is a single factor price
change for each factor of production (capital and the three types of labor). However,
there are still distributional effects across workers according to skill type, and across
geographic locations according to the skill composition of the labor force.
Table 3.5 reports the real wage changes by skill type. In the United States, in
all scenarios the wage changes increase with skill: more skilled workers are hurt less
by the dismantling of NAFTA. Intriguingly, the pattern is U-shaped in Mexico, with
the medium-skilled workers hurt the most by NAFTA dissolution in all scenarios.
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In Canada, all skill types are worse off, but the relative ranking is not stable across
scenarios, indicating sensitivity to assumptions on the pattern of trade cost changes
across sectors.
The fourth and fifth columns report the total proportional and dollar amount
welfare changes. These are very similar to the baseline, indicating that assumptions
on cross-sectoral factor mobility are not crucial for the aggregate welfare. A similar
result was found by Levchenko and Zhang (2013).
Turning to the geographic distribution of real wage changes, we construct con-
gressional district average real wage changes by using skill shares in each district,










where ωsc is the share of skill s in district c. Thus, districts with more skilled workers
lose relatively less in the long run from the dismantling of NAFTA, as their wages
fall by less. Note that the range of wage changes across skills, at only 0.07 percentage
points in the baseline, is far smaller than the range of wage changes across sectors in
the specific-factors model, which was about 5 percentage points. Thus, as expected
the range of average wage changes across locations is also quite small, about 0.02
percentage points. Figure 3.8 presents the scatterplots of the revocation of NAFTA
against the Trump vote share. There is still a systematically negative relationship
between the long-run district-level real wage change and the Trump vote share. In
fact, in several scenarios this relationship is stronger than in the specific-factors case.
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3.6.2 Varying the productivity dispersion parameter
In this robustness check, we repeat the main counterfactuals using alternative
values of θ = {2.5; 8}. These values represent the typical range of θ used in the trade
literature. Table 3.6 shows the employment weighted average wage change for the
different values of θ. Table 3.6 presents the aggregate real wage changes and welfare
changes. We only report the baseline NTB scenario (the others deliver similar results
and are available upon request). The alternative values of θ produce quite similar
overall welfare changes. Appendix Figures C.1 and C.2 present the scatterplots of
the Trump vote share against real wage changes at the congressional district level for
the two alternative values of θ. The overall patterns are the same as in the baseline.
3.6.3 Difference with Romney vote
It may be informative to focus on voters that changed their vote in the 2016
election. To this end, Appendix Figure C.3 shows the scatterplots of the difference
between the Trump 2016 vote share and the Romney 2012 vote share against the
average real wage change at the congressional district level (left panel) and state
level (right panel). Negative correlations are if anything more pronounced for the
Trump-Romney increment than the Trump vote share itself, especially at the state
level.
3.7 Conclusion
Today’s global production arrangements will lead to strong spillovers of protec-
tionist policies. Barriers to input trade can reduce the competitiveness of domestic
industries as internationally sourced inputs become more expensive. In a global
input-output network, a tariff aimed at one specific trade partner or import sec-
tor ultimately affects all sectors of the domestic economy, yet very heterogeneously
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so. It is thus a domestic redistributive policy. In a highly interconnected world
economy with supply chains crossing country borders, it is not transparent which
workers stand to gain or lose from trade policy changes. In this paper, we undertake
a quantitative assessment of both the aggregate and the distributional effects of one
proposed trade policy change: revoking NAFTA.
We find that NAFTA revocation lowers real incomes in the large majority of
sectors in all three NAFTA countries, and that average wages fall in nearly all US
congressional districts, and in all Mexican states and Canadian provinces. Within
this range of negative values, however, these are still differences in outcomes across
locations. Correlating real wage changes with recent voting patterns, we show that
if anything Trump-voting congressional districts would lose relatively more from the
revocation of NAFTA. Our results underscore the difficulty of making simple heuristic














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Skill-specific wage and welfare changes
Real wage change, %
High skill Medium skill Low skill Total welfare in bn. US$
change, %
Tariff and NTB baseline
Canada -1.39 -1.29 -0.29 -2.04 -34.38
Mexico -1.19 -1.90 -0.73 -1.57 -19.20
United States -0.31 -0.33 -0.38 -0.23 -40.68
Tariff only
Canada -0.27 -0.39 -0.49 -0.05 -0.88
Mexico -0.33 -0.67 0.02 -0.14 -1.67
United States -0.05 -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 -2.12
Tariff and uniform NTB
Canada -1.85 -1.99 -1.80 -1.97 -33.12
Mexico -1.44 -2.56 -1.38 -1.68 -20.53
United States -0.27 -0.28 -0.31 -0.23 -41.95
Notes: This table reports the aggregate real wage changes for each skill type, and the total welfare changes, in
percentage points and in billion US$, for the NAFTA countries under the three NAFTA revocation scenarios.
Table 3.6:
Aggregate real wage changes and welfare changes for different θ (Tariff and NTB baseline)
Real wage change, % Total welfare in bn. US$
change, %
θ = 2.5
Canada -1.93 -2.23 -37.62
Mexico -1.98 -1.77 -21.65
United States -0.32 -0.26 -46.75
θ = 8
Canada -1.41 -1.96 -33.01
Mexico -1.60 -1.73 -21.10
United States -0.23 -0.19 -34.19
Notes: This table reports the aggregate real wage changes and the total welfare changes, in percentage points and
in billion US$, for the NAFTA countries under the two alternative values of θ.
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Figure 3.8: Real wage changes and 2016 Trump vote share, mobile factors
Congressional district level State level
































































































































































































































































































































































































































-.345 -.34 -.335 -.33 -.325 -.32

























































-.334 -.332 -.33 -.328 -.326


























































































































































































































































































































































































































-.075 -.07 -.065 -.06 -.055

























































-.066 -.064 -.062 -.06
Average real wage change (in %) 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































-.288 -.286 -.284 -.282 -.28 -.278

























































-.284 -.283 -.282 -.281 -.28
Average real wage change (in %) 
Notes: This figure depicts the scatterplots of the average real wage change from revoking NAFTA and the 2016
Trump vote share by congressional district (left side) and state (right side) under the assumption of perfect factor
mobility across sectors, along with the OLS fit. The boxes report the coefficient, robust standard error, and the R2





Appendices to Chapter 1
A.1 Data
This sections details the sources of the data and addresses potential concerns
about its quality.
A.1.1 Trade data
Construction of the trade data
The main dataset in the analysis is the firm-port-destination export dataset. I
build this dataset by combining several sources.
India importer-exporter directory I first use the India Importer and Exporter direc-
tory published by the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics
branch of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.1 The directory contains a list of
Indian firms involved in importing or exporting in India. To perform any import or
export transaction in India, firms need to register to get an Importer-Exporter Code
(IEC). The directory contains the details of around twenty thousand firms with their
IEC. The coverage includes firms that self-registered, and firms that were added by
1The directory can be accessed online at the DGCIS website: http://dgciskol.gov.in/ under the menu “Trade
Directory”.
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the DGCIS based on observed transactions from the Customs. The additional details
are the firms’ address and items (HS code) they import or export.
Exporter Status List I complement the list of firms by using the list of IECs of
firms with special Exporter Status delivered by the Directorate General of Foreign
Trade. Large exporters can obtain a special status that allows them to lower their
administrative burden, for example by self-authenticating certificates of origin.
Firms’ address and branches I get additional firm details such as addresses of the
headquarter and all branches from the Customs National Trade Portal (icegate).2 I
get the coordinates of each postal code (pincode) from http://www.geonames.org/.
I complete missing coordinates by manually searching for the postal codes on Google
maps.
List of transactions by firm I obtained the list of import and export transaction
for each IEC from ICEGATE’s “IECwise summary report” form.3 The list includes
the shipping bill number (or for exports the bill of entry number), the date of the
transaction and the port of exit (entry). I then obtain additional details of the
transactions from the public enquiry “tracking at ICES” form using the shipping
bill and bill of entry numbers. The additional details are value, weight, and port
of destination as well as other additional dates (“let export”, “out of charge”). For
export transactions through an Inland port, the details also include the eventual
Indian port of exit.
2The details used to also be available from the DGFT’s website, where I obtained the data for most of the firms.
Cross-checks between ICEGATE’s data and the DGFT’s data ensured that the two are identical.
3Until early 2021, that form was publicly available. It has since been made private.
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Sectoral classification I merge the list of exporter/importer firms with the Indian
Economic Census directories of establishment4 and with the “Master Details” of
registered companies from the Ministry of Corporate Affairs.5 I use a name-matching
algorithm together with postal code matching, to match the firm names in my trade
dataset to the firms in those two sources. I can then obtain the NIC code for each
firm.6
Representativity of the final trade dataset
Firm sample The final sample is comprised of 16,000 firms. Table A.1 lists largest
sectors at the NIC-2digits level. The main sectors are the usual manufacturing
sectors, as well as wholesale and intermediaries (74 and 51)) that account for around
20% all transactions. Appendix A.2 discuss the robustness of the paper’s stylized
facts to removing those intermediaries. Table A.2 displays the summary statistics of
total export transactions, value, number of destinations, and number of ports used
by firm.
Table A.1: Main sectoral composition
NIC 2-digits Description Share of obs Share of value
24 Chemicals and Chemical Products 0.126 0.122
74 Other business activities 0.113 0.094
51 Wholesale trade 0.106 0.127
17 Textiles 0.078 0.059
18 Wearing apparel 0.060 0.030
29 Machinery and equipment NEC 0.056 0.042
27 Basic Metals 0.042 0.061
15 Food and Beverages 0.039 0.040
28 Fabricated Metal Products 0.032 0.027
25 Rubber and Plastic 0.029 0.018
Notes: “NIC” refers to the National Industry Classification, which falls under the general International Standard
Industry Classification (ISIC). One observation is a transaction.
4These lists are available from the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation at http://www.mospi.
nic.in
5That data is available from the MCA’s website at http://www.mca.gov.in/.
6NIC stands for “National Industry Classification”, which is a sectoral classification consistent with the UN’s
International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC).
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Table A.2: Firm level summary statistics
Value (log) Number of ports Number of destinations
Average 13.83 1.64 7.72
Median 14.13 1 4
p25 12.41 1 1
p75 15.45 2 10
Notes: The table shows summary statistics of total (log) exports in USD, number of ports used, and number of
destination served per firm for the year 2019.
The total exports in my dataset for the year of 2019 are around 90.9 USD billion,
against 324 billion in the aggregate official statistics. Below, I show that even though
my sample only covers around 29% percent of total exports, it is representative in
terms of port usage and destinations.
Port and country shares To check how my sample compares to the aggregate in
terms of ports and country shares, I download the port-country level exports from
the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics.7 The left panel
of Figure A.1 plots the share of each port in my sample against the share in the full
dataset. The dots are located along a 45 degree line, indicating that my sample is
representative in this key dimension. The right panel of Figure A.1 repeats the same
exercise at the country level. Again, all dots are close to the 45 degree line.
A.1.2 Port data and sea distance
Ports coordinates I use the UN/LOCODE database to get the coordinates of
Indian and foreign ports.8 For some Indian ports, coordinates are missing. I manually
add them by searching for the port on Google maps.
Ports characteristics I use the annual “Basic Ports Statistics of India” published
by the Transport Research Wing of the Shipping Ministry to get data on port to-
7That data is available from the “Data dissemination portal” on the DGCIS’ website at http://dgciskol.gov.in/.
8The data is available at https://unece.org/trade/uncefact/unlocode
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Notes: The left panel displays the fit between the share of Indian exports through each port between my sample and
the official aggregate data. The right panel displays the fit between the share of Indian exports to each destinations
between my sample and the official aggregate data.
pography (minimum depth), equipment (number of berth, handling equipment) and
capacity.9 The same report also contains measures of port productivity (turnaround
time, pre-berthing wait time, output per ship berth-day).
Sea distance I compute the sea distance between each port and foreign port des-
tination using the searoute package from Eurostat.10 I then use the average distance
between the port and all foreign ports (weighted by number of transactions) in the
country of destination as my measure of port-destination sea distance.
A.1.3 Road data
Highway data My main source of data for the road network is Open Street Map
(OSM). OSM is a crowd-sourced map of the world, that includes details on roads
among many other things. Each road is classified by category of importance, and
highways with a separation in the middle are marked as oneway. Further, information
9The reports are available at http://shipmin.gov.in/division/transport-research
10The package is available at https://github.com/eurostat/searoute and allows to compute the sea distance
between two points by specifying their coordinates.
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on the number of lanes is available for a subset of the roads. I use the oneway
classification, the lane number, and additional category classification (motorway,
trunk road) in the OSM data to construct two categories of highway: four or more
lanes (more than 2 lanes per direction, with a physical separation in the middle,
which I label as “expressway”), or twoway highways (no separation in the middle,
the majority of which have 2 lanes in total, shared for both directions, which I label
as “normal road”).
I extract all large roads from OSM using the following rule. I first extract any
road segment from OSM that are either tagged as “NHXX”, where NH stands for
“National Highway” and XX for the relevant number. Then, because some states
also have high quality state highways, I also keep any segment that matches the tag
“motorway”, “trunk”, or “motorroad=yes”.11
One concern regarding this source of data is that it is user-based and might miss
some information. However, information on large highways (which constitute the
part of the infrastructure used in the analysis) are less likely to be missing. Finally,
my classification fits the official data well at the state level. The left panel of Figure
A.2 shows the scatter plot of the length by category at the state level in my final
data and against the official 2017 statistics. The right panel shows the share of
“expressway” against the share of national highways with 4 or more lanes (in total
for both directions) in the state. The dots lie along the 45 degree line, and the
correlation is large and highly significant. In the aggregate, the road network in my
data contains around 54,900 km of “expressway” and 164,500 km of “normal road”.
11See https://wiki.openstreetmap.org/wiki/Tagging_Roads_in_India for the guidelines that users are invited
to follow when tagging Indian roads on OSM. I also keep “link” segments between motorways and trunk roads.
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Notes: The figure compares my final data to the data from the “Basic Road Statistics of India 2016-2017”. The left
panel displays the total length of road in my data in a given state (in logs), against the official state aggregate. The
right panel displays the share of road (by length) that I classify as “expressway” on the y axis, against the official
share of national highway with 4 lanes of more. The size of the circle is proportional to total road length in the state.
Least-cost distance To compute the least-cost route between an origin district and
a port, I first compute the centroid of the district based on the map files provided
by the Data{Meet} Community Maps Project.12 I then find the closest point of the
centroid on the highway network, and use that point as the starting point of routes
from the district to the ports. I also place the ports on their closest point on the
network.
I compute the least-cost route to each port according to equations (1.10) and
(1.11), by fist weighting the edges of the highway network using their distance mul-
tiplied by the cost parameters βc, and then using the Dijkstra algorithm. I compute
the district-district road distances in the same way.
A.2 Stylized facts robustness
Figure A.3 displays the number of ports per sector-origin-destination triplet for
different aggregation of origin and destination, and for different firm subsamples. In
12See http://projects.datameet.org/maps/districts/.
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Notes: The top left panel displays the histogram of the number of ports per origin-sector-destination triplet, where
the origin is a 6-digit postal code. The top right panel defines a destination as a discharge port rather than a country.
The bottom left panel defines a destination as a discharge port. The bottom right panel removes firms whose ISIC
code could refer to intermediaries (51 and 74). Only triplets with more than one firm are kept to avoid artificial
ones.
all cases, there is more than one port for the majority of triplets.
A.3 Estimation
In this section, I provide more details about the estimation procedure for θ, and
additional robustness checks.
A.3.1 Elasticity estimation
Moment condition derivation To derive the moment condition, it is useful to



























where Γ is the Gamma function. To prove this, notice that the CDF of the minimum

































So the PDF of the trade cost is given by:











































































and using the fact that Γ (α) =
∫




























, so using the
previous result, the expectation of the ratios of values with respect to the Fréchet
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where I used the previous results with λ = (1 − σ) for the terms in the nominator
and λ = (σ − 1) for the terms in the denominator. The law of iterated expectation
and the independence of ε across firms, ports and destination allows to solve for the
expectation of each term separately.
Robustness Table A.3 shows the results of the estimation of the port elasticity θ
when using shares of transactions as a measure for πoρd, and Table A.4 shows the
results of the estimation of the port elasticity θ when using shares of value as a
measure for πoρd.
Table A.3: Elasticity estimation results (share of transactions)
District level Postal code level
Pooled ISIC3 ISIC5 Pooled ISIC3 ISIC5
σ−1
θ 0.826 0.855 0.839 0.889 0.867 0.853
(.002) (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002)
N 2,587,540 289,036 134,536 9,394,312 686,531 219,800
Cluster destination pair
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating the elasticity parameter using the strategy outlined in section 1.4.
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Table A.4: Elasticity estimation results (share of FOB value)
District level Postal code level
Pooled ISIC3 ISIC5 Pooled ISIC3 ISIC5
σ−1
θ 0.745 0.788 .7759 0.747 0.795 0.780
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.005) (.009) (.0045
N 2,587,540 289,036 134,536 9,394,312 686,531 219,800
Cluster destination pair
Notes: This table shows the results of estimating the elasticity parameter using the strategy outlined in section 1.4.
A.4 Model appendix
A.4.1 Model calibration data
The calibration approach uses the following Lemma, taken from Eckert (2019):







For any strictly positive Ai  0, Bi  0 such that Ai = Bi, and strictly positive
matrix K > 0, there exist a unique (to scale), strictly positive vector of λi  0.
Proof. See Eckert (2019).
Lemma A.1 implies that given dod and αdXd, there is a unique (to scale) vector
of λo that satisfies equation (1.24). To further fit the observable country-level trade









































































γ)−θ]− 1θ if o /∈ IN, d ∈ IN
τod if o, d /∈ IN
The normalization constants aexpd and a
imp
o allow me to match the aggregate Indian
shares πDATAIND,d and π
DATA
o,IND exactly, while the relative costs τ̃od drive the within-India
regional variation. I use the following iterative algorithm to solve for λ:









1−σ ,∀o, d /∈ IND,



































Xd, normalizing λ1 = 1.
3. Go back to 1 with the new guess for λ until convergence.
A.5 Counterfactuals appendix
A.5.1 Equilibrium in changes
The equilibrium in changes is a set of trade share changes π̂od, wage changes ŵd,































where the changes in trade costs d̂od are exogenous and given by:
d̂od =











o indian district, d foreign
1 o, d indian districts
and τ̂oρ and τ̂ρ are as specified in section 1.7.2.
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APPENDIX B
Appendices to Chapter 2
B.1 Simplified model derivation























Define Pn as the total population of region n: Pn =
αγn+(1−α)βn
1−α L if n ∈ US, and





Before taking the derivative of equation (B.1), consider first the partial derivatives































, i ∈ US
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And when i is the rest of the world, we also have to take into account changes in






























, i = RW





































































































































































































































































(1−α) is equal to the migrant population in state n, and
αL
1−α is equal to



































































































which is equation (2.4).
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B.2 Additional regression results
Table B.1 displays the full results of the regression presented in the main body of
the paper. All first stage results are strong, and the sign of bilateral controls are as
expected.
Table B.1: Full Results and First Stage Regressions
log (exports) First stage
OLS IV ln(mig) ln(HSmig) ln(LSmig)
ln (migrants) 0.152*** 0.208***
(.059) (.065)
ln (HSmig) 0.091+ 0.308***
(.052) (.105)
ln (LSmig) 0.057 -0.056
(.038) (.077)
ln(distance) -1.377** -1.387** -1.325** -1.342** -0.364+ -0.752+ -0.443
(.621) (.622) (.595) (.593) (0.213) (.377) (.282)
Adjacency 0.348*** 0.346*** 0.304*** 0.289*** 0.097 0.513*** 0.345







KP F-Stat 791.3 140.7
Imp. and exp. FE X X X X X X X
Country clust. SE X X X X X X X
N 2511 2511 2511 2511 2511 2511 2511
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, +: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01
Table B.2 shows additional results. Columns 1 and 2 show results of a PPMLE
(see Silva and Tenreyro (2006)) estimation, columns 3-4 show the results using
log (1 +mig) in order to avoid droping observations where states have positive ex-
ports, but no migrant population, and columns 5-6 show results using all countries
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to which a US state has positive exports.1 All regressions use the same instrumental
variable strategy as the main ones. In all robustness checks, the positive effect of
migrants remains, and the difference in skills as well.
Table B.2: Robustness results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PPMLE migrants = 1 +mig Extended sample
ln (migrants) 0.275*** 0.204*** 0.141***
(.056) (.054) (0.033)
ln (HSmig) 0.489*** 0.305*** 0.316***
(.127) (.099) (.064)
ln (LSmig) -0.121 -0.041 -0.098**
(.090) (.067) (.047)
KP F-Stat 586.2 99.2 2387.5 352.9
Imp. and exp. FE X X X X X X
Standard Errors robust robust imp. clust. imp. clust. imp. clust. imp. clust.
N 2719 2517 2704 2552 5918 5150
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis, *: p < 0.1, **: p < 0.05, ***: p < 0.01
B.3 Skill and imperfect substitutability model
B.3.1 Model details
The following set of equations characterize the equilibrium in the skill model.
Most of the derivations are the same as the ones presented for the main model.

















and each skill labor bundle cost is itself given by:
1In the bigger sample, there are a total of 135 countries, but not all states export to them. Due to convergence











where the labor bundle costs are derived from the firm’s profit maximization
problem.














































ε N si γ,
where γ = Γ( ε−1
ε
















2For expositional convenience, I am omitting the fact that when n ∈ US, workers from every US states get wage



































































Following steps similar to Dekle et al. (2008), one can solve for the proportional





n , P̂n, d̂ni, Ĉn, Ĉ
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Ân, τ̂in) can be obtained from the following system of equations (where ŷ = y1/y0 is




















































where Θsin is the initial share of the wage bill going to s-skill workers from i, in






















































1 (i | n /∈ US)
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Solving the model in changes enables me to solve for counterfactual quantities
given exogenous changes in technology A, B, and migration and trade costs κ and τ ,
by using only data on trade, migration, and age bill shares (πtradeik , π
s,mig
ik , Xi, N
sd
ik ,
N smik , Θ
s
in), as well as parameter values for ε, θ, ρ, λ and η
s. Subsection B.3.2 details
how to map these objects into the data.
B.3.2 Calibration of the skill model
Table B.3 lists the value of the parameters and their source. The following sub-
sections provide additional details on the link between the data and the model.
B.4 Data and calibration
B.4.1 Population data
Total migrant stock To get the total number of migrants born in i and living in
j, I combine the American Community Survey 2013 data that provides information
on place of birth of residents in each US states with estimates from the World Bank
on residing population in each country (POPi), and estimates of Bilateral Migration
Matrix for 2013 (MIGij for i 6= j, which translates directly into Nij in the model).5
The 2013 ACS is the survey used in the construction of the 2013 World Bank Bilateral
Migration Matrix, ensuring consistency.
For i /∈ US, I construct the total number of native from in country i (Ni in the























Table B.3: Link between the model and the data
Description Value Source
Parameter
ε migration elasticity 2.3 Caliendo et al. (2017)
ρ Elasticity of substitution
between skill
1.6 Katz and Murphy (1992)
λ Elasticity of substitution
between native and mi-
grant work
20 Ottaviano and Peri (2012)











in,τ̂in 1 keep constant
κ̂sin migration costs Uniformly increased to
target a reduction of 50%
in total migrant stock liv-




in population data ACS, World Bank, OECD
πtradein , Xn trade data (including ser-
vices)
Census data on state
level exports and imports,
WIOD, CFS
Θsin initial wage bill shares ACS, IPMUS-
International
Notes: see below for details on the sources and exact mapping between the data and the model objects.
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model) as:
Ni = POPi +
∑
j 6=i,j /∈US
(MIGij −MIGji) + (MIGi,US −MIGUS,i)
For i or j in the US, I first use the ACS to construct Ni,US, which I define as the
total population born in state i and residing in the US (Ni,US =
∑
j∈US Nij, where
Nij comes directly from the ACS data). I then use the aggregate World Bank data
on US natives living abroad and attribute them to each state proportionally to Ni,US.





When both i and j are US states, Nij comes directly from the ACS data. I can
then construct Ni =
∑
j Nij.
Skill and unskilled migration shares For the model with different skill levels, I
collect additional data on education attainment. I defined skill as having completed
some tertiary education (ISCED ≥ 5). To compute the shares of skill and unskilled
workers per country pair, I use various data sources.
When j ∈ US, I use the ACS data obtained through IPUMS to compute the share




When j ∈ {CAN,MEX}, I use survey data from IPUMS-International (corre-
sponding to the 2011 Census for Canada and 2010 Census for Mexico6) and compute
the skill share: shskillsij =
IPUMSsij
IPUMSij
. When i ∈ US, there is no information on the
state of origin. In that case, I use the ACS data to apportion the skilled and unskilled










6The 2013 World Bank Bilateral Migration Matrix is based on the United Nations database
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013, which uses country-level Census rounds. The 2011 Canada and 2010 Mexico cen-
suses were the last one available for the construction of these datasets, thus ensuring consistency between the
migration data and the skill shares.
140
When j /∈ {US,CAN,MEX} and i = j, I impute shskillsjj as the overall skill
share in the country, using data from the OECD’s World Indicators of Skills for
Employment database.7. As long as the total migrant share is low, this provides
a good approximation of the native’s skill composition. When i 6= j, I impute









It is important to note that migrant stocks for population residing in US states
come directly from the ACS and are precisely measured. Similarly, data for Canada
and Mexico (countries that will be most relevant in my counterfactual) comes from
survey data. Imputation only occurs for foreign countries, where the counterfactual
only has a second order effect. Hence the results won’t be sensitive to the imputation
method.
B.4.2 Expenditure data
I combine data from the OECD Inter-Country Input Output Table (ICIO) for
2013, the Commodity Flow Survey, and Census data on state level exports and
imports to compute expenditure data.













where Xcensus,EXij is the Census Origin of Movement export value. That is, I allocate













where Xcensus,IMij is the Census state of destination import value. That is, I allocate
the US import value from the ICIO to each state using the share of imports going
to the state.









where XCFSij is the total value of shipments from state i to state j in the Commodity
Flow Survey public use micro data. This potentially overestimate the total trade be-
tween states, as industries covered in the CFS don’t include services, which are more
tradable.8 In Appendix B.5, I check the robustness of my results to this assumption
by assuming that the same fraction of service output that is exported by the US to
the rest of the world is also traded within the US. More precisely, define the share







computing Xij for i 6= j, i, j ∈ US, use that same share to compute trade flows:
Xij =
(










where I use sectoral employment data to attribute the service production to each
state. For own-state flow, I use:9
















8In the ICIO data, the share of US exports in US service output is around 5%, while it is around 15% for
non-services. I define services as anything that is not agriculture, mining or manufacturing.
9This is probably an underestimation of within US service trade flows, as services are probably more tradable
domestically than internationally.
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B.4.3 Wage bill data by origin and skill
For the US states, Canada and Mexico, I compute the shares of wage bill required
to solve the model (Θin in the main model, Θ
s
in in the skill model) directly from
the survey data also used to construct the migration shares.10 This ensures that the
migration and wage bill data are consistent with each other.
For other countries where survey data is not readily available, I simply use migrant
population shares to input the wage bill shares. This assumes that the average wage
of all workers in the country is the same, which ignores selection into migration.
However, when using the same method to impute wage bill shares for US states,
Canada and Mexico, the correlation is high at 0.99. Furthermore, the counterfactual
will mostly affect the US, Canada and Mexico to a lesser extent, and the rest of the
world much less. Hence the parameters for the rest of the world imputed from US,
Canada and Mexican data don’t have a significant quantitative importance.
B.4.4 List of regions in the model
Table B.4 lists the regions in the model. It is comprised of the US 50 states plus
the District of Columbia, as well as 56 countries and a composite Rest of the World
(ROW). A large majority of migrant population and trade flows are covered by the
individual countries. The ROW accounts for on average 10% of a state’s exports
and 31% of a state’s migrant population. The main missing migrant countries are
Central American countries such as El Salvador, Cuba, the Dominican Republic or
Guatemala, which are all small trading partners.
10I use the average wage of migrants fo skill s from i in n, multiplied by the total number of migrants Nsin, to get
the total wage bill paid to migrants from i in n, and compute the shares from there.
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Table B.4: List of regions in the model
US States Countries
Alabama Argentina Iceland
Alaska Nebraska Australia Israel
Arizona Nevada Austria Italy
Arkansas New Hampshire Belgium Japan
California New Jersey Bulgaria Kazakhstan
Colorado New Mexico Brazil Korea
Connecticut New York Canada Lithuania
Delaware North Carolina Switzerland Latvia
Dist. of Columbia North Dakota Chile Morocco
Florida Ohio China Mexico
Georgia Oklahoma Colombia Malaysia
Hawaii Oregon Costa rica Netherlands
Idaho Pennsylvania Cyprus Norway
Illinois Rhode Island Czech Republic New Zealand
Indiana South Carolina Germany Peru
Iowa South Dakota Denmark Philippines
Kansas Tennessee Spain Poland
Kentucky Texas Finland Portugal
Louisiana Utah France Romania
Maine Vermont United Kingdom Russia
Maryland Virginia Greece Saudi Arabia
Massachusetts Washington Hong Kong Singapore
Michigan West Virginia Croatia Slovakia
Minnesota Wisconsin Hungary Sweden
Mississippi Wyoming Indonesia Thailand
Missouri India Vietnam
Montana Ireland South Africa
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B.5 Robustness checks
In this section, I assess the robustness of the results to different values of the trade
and migration elasticity, as well as an alternative way of computing within-US trade
flows.
Main model Table B.5 displays the average changes in trade costs, export as
share of output, and welfare for alternative calibration for the main counterfactual.
Overall, the results are fairly stable when changing the migration elasticity. The
change in export trade costs is sensitive to the trade elasticity, because I calibrate
η = 0.2/θ, but the effect on exports as share of output is stable. The change in welfare
is larger for a small trade elasticity, as wages need to fall by more to achieve the same
change in exports. Figure B.1 shows the average changes in real wages across US
states, decomposed into the average own-state effect, internal market access effect,
and international market access, for the same set of robustness checks. In all cases,
the own-state effect is positive, because the reduced labor supply is not offset by
a larger reduction in market access when only migrant population in the state is
reduced. The intra- and international market access effects are negative throughout.
Skill and imperfect substitutability model Table B.6 displays the average changes
in trade costs, export as share of output, and welfare for alternative calibration
for the main counterfactual with the skill and substitutability model. Figure B.2
shows the average changes in real wages across US states, decomposed into the aver-
age own-state effect, internal market access effect, and international market access.
The native/migrant elasticity of substitution plays an important role in determining
wether the own-state effect (driven mainly by the labor supply effect) is positive or
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Table B.5: Sensitivity analysis for the main model
Migration elasticity Trade elasticity Less tradable
ε = 1.5 ε = 3 θ = 2 θ = 6 services
Change in state export costs 3.67% 3.69% 7.52% 2.44% 3.68%
(exports weighted) (.16) (.16) (.34) (.10) (0.16)
Change in exports -4.97% -4.27% -4.06% -4.62% -4.59%
as share of output (0.92) (1.10) (1.00) (1.08) (1.18)
Change in natives’ welfare -0.13% -0.13% -0.23% -0.09% -0.07%
(0.06) (0.10) (0.14) (0.06) (0.05)
Notes: The table shows the percentage changes, after reducing the share of migrants in the US population by half.
Numbers are average across US states, with standard deviation in parenthesis. See section B.4.2 for details on the
“Less tradable services” scenario.
Figure B.1: Real wage change decomposition: robustness
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Table B.6: Sensitivity analysis for the skill and imperfect substitutability model
Native/migrant Skill Less tradable
substitutability substitutability services
λ = 5 λ = 100 ρ = 50
Change in state export costs 5.44% 5.50% 5.49% 5.48%
(exports weighted) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Change in exports -6.82% -7.22% -7.09% -7.35%
as share of output (1.35) (1.34) (1.34) (1.39)
Change in US low-skill welfare -0.84% -0.21% -0.36% -0.25%
(0.24) (0.21) (0.06) (0.16)
Change in US college welfare -0.93% -0.23% -0.36% -0.30%
(0.19) (0.07) (0.05) (.07)
Notes: The table shows the percentage changes, after reducing the share of migrants in the US population by half.
Numbers are average across US states, with standard deviation in parenthesis. See section B.4.2 for details on the
“Less tradable services” scenario.
negative. With a low elasticity of substitution, the effect of the reduction in migra-
tion is large and negative, while a high substitutability moves the results closer to
the main model.11 The skill substitutability matters less. Overall, both the intra-
and international market access effects stay large and negative, regardless of the
production function elasticities.
B.6 Algorithms
B.6.1 Algorithm for the main model
This section describes how to solve the model in changes. This solution allows
for trade deficits Dn to exist, hence the relevant income for location is not wage wn
but vn = wn +Dn/Ln.
12 Results in the paper come from first creating a deficit-free
11The baseline model without skills and imperfect native-migrant substitutability does not produce exactly the
same results as the refined model even when both λ and ρ are set to infinity, because of the different migration shares
of skilled and unskilled workers. Since the model interprets high migration shares as reflecting a high Bsin, the fall
in effective labor supply is different in the two models even with infinite substitutability.
12That is, I assume that the deficit is redistributed uniformly to each efficiency unit of labor. Using the following








Figure B.2: Imperfect substitutability scenario robustness: decomposition
Low-skill, native wage changes
High-skill, native wage change
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equilibrium by solving the system of equation below setting D̂n = 0 while keeping
other exogenous variables constant, and then using the resulting trade, migration
and wage bill shares to solve for a counterfactual change in migration costs.13
1. Guess π̂migin






1 + 1 (i, n /∈ US)N̂inNin





3. Solve for ŵi : guess for ŵi




















and normalize the new output such that total world output remains con-








































































(d) Go back to (a) using updated ŵn







































5. Go back to 1 using updated π̂migin
B.6.2 Algorithm for the skill model
This section describes how to solve the model in changes. This solution allows for







n , where I assume that deficits are redistributed proportionally to
income.14 Results in the paper come from first creating a deficit-free equilibrium by
solving the system of equation below setting D̂n = 0 while keeping other exogenous
variables constant, and then using the resulting trade and migration shares to solve












































































2. Solve for N̂ sin, L̂
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3. Solve for ŵsdn , ŵ
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and normalize the new output such that total world output remains con-









































































(e) Go back to (a) using updated ŵsdn .
4. Solve for v̂sdn , v̂
sm





















































5. Go back to 1 using the updated π̂s,migin
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APPENDIX C
Appendices to Chapter 3
C.1 Solution algorithm
To solve equations (3.8) to (3.15) start by guessing {ŵjn, r̂jn} and use the following
algorithm.











































































(1 + τ ′i,nm)
)
4. update the next guess for ŵjn, r̂jn from the labor market clearing condition









the solution is defined up to a numeraire, and in updating the ŵjn and r̂jn’s,
re-set a numeraire country’s ŵ1 = 1 (where country 1, sector 1 is the numeraire).









Figure C.1 plots the real wage changes against the Trump vote share when the
trade elasticity is equal to 2.5. Figure C.2 plots the real wage changes against the
Trump vote share when the trade elasticity is equal to 8.
Figure plots the real wage changes against the difference between 2016 Trump
and 2012 Romney vote.
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Figure C.1: Real wage changes and 2016 Trump vote share, θ = 2.5
Congressional district level State level
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Average real wage change (in %) 
Notes: This figure depicts the scatterplots of the average real wage change from revoking NAFTA and the 2016
Trump vote share by congressional district (left side) and state (right side), along the OLS fit. The boxes report the
coefficient, robust standard error, and the R2 of the bivariate regression. The model is solved under θ = 2.5.
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Figure C.2: Real wage changes and 2016 Trump vote share, θ = 8
Congressional district level State level
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Average real wage change (in %) 
Notes: This figure depicts the scatterplots of the average real wage change from revoking NAFTA and the 2016
Trump vote share by congressional district (left side) and state (right side), along the OLS fit. The boxes report the
coefficient, robust standard error, and the R2 of the bivariate regression. The model is solved under θ = 8.
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Figure C.3:
Real wage changes and the difference between 2016 Trump vote share and the 2012
Romney vote share
Congressional district level State level
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Average real wage change (in %) 
Notes: This figure depicts the scatterplots of the average real wage change from revoking NAFTA and the difference
between the 2016 Trump vote share and the 2012 Romney vote share by congressional district (left side) and state




Table C.1 displays the countries in the quantitative model, Table C.2 shows the
sectors in the model, Table C.3 displays the assumed tariff and NTB changes, and
Table C.4 displays the bottom and top 10 districts in terms of real wage change.
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Rest of the World ROW
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Table C.2: List of sectors
Sector description WIOD sector
Crop and animal production, hunting 1
Forestry and logging 2
Fishing and aquaculture 3
Mining and quarrying 4
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco products 5
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 6
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture 7
Manufacture of paper and paper products 8
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 9
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 10
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 11
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations 12
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 13
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 14
Manufacture of basic metals 15
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 16
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 17
Manufacture of electrical equipment 18
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 19
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 20
Manufacture of other transport equipment 21
Other manufacturing, repair and installation of machinery and equipment 22-23
Energy, AC; Water ; Sewerage and waste management services 24-26
Construction 27
Wholesale and retail trade 28-29
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 30
Land transport and transport via pipelines 31
Water transport 32
Air transport 33
Warehousing and support activities for transportation; Postal activities 34-35
Accommodation and food service activities 36
Publishing, telecommunications, computer, information service 37-40
Financial and insurance service activities and auxiliaries 41-43
Real estate, legal, accounting, consultancy, scientific, veterinary activities 44-49
Administrative and support service activities 50
Public admin. and defense; compulsory social security; Education 51-52
Human health and social work activities 53
Other service activities; Activities of households as employers 54
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Table C.3: Assumed changes in US tariffs and NTB on Canada and Mexico if NAFTA is revoked
WIOD Sector ∆τj,CAN USA ∆τj,MEX USA ∆ηj,mUSA
1 3.447 3.440 7.651
2 3.898 3.362 0
3 0.088 0.324 0
4 0.003 0.006 27.997
5 3.526 4.992 5.076
6 3.006 4.323 0
7 0.620 5.371 9.606
8 0.225 1.812 6.609
9 0.020 0.001 23.593
10 3.677 4.815 7.506
11 2.741 2.918 8.056
12 0.176 0.370 4.795
13 1.962 1.491 11.365
14 1.816 3.927 0.606
15 1.043 0.999 8.637
16 1.844 3.190 16.779
17 2.094 1.846 1.782
18 2.482 2.772 9.840
19 0.982 1.400 3.134
20 2.406 6.288 12.682
21 0.188 1.206 7.074
22-23 1.573 1.803 0
24-26 0.800 4.118 9.734
27 0 0 7.660
28-29 0 0 25.964
30 0 0 32.112
31 0 0 10.204
32 0 0 9.840
33 0 0 4.741
34-35 0 0 12.830
36 0 0 0
37-40 0.004 0.002 15.182
41-43 0 0 14.974
44-49 0 0 17.838
50 0 0 0
51-52 0 0 0
53 0 0 27.396
54 0.364 1.677 4.424
Notes: This Table reports the change in sectoral tariffs on Mexico and Canada, and the change in the NTBs imposed
by the US on Mexico and Canada, if NAFTA is revoked, expressed in percentage points. The sector key is in Table
C.2.
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Table C.4: Top and bottom 10 U.S. districts (Tariff and NTB baseline)
Top 10
District Real wage change, % Wage+tariff revenue, %
Texas, 11th 0.08 0.19
Wyoming (at large) -0.04 0.07
West Virginia, 3rd -0.08 0.05
New Mexico, 2nd -0.11 0.01
North Dakota (at large) -0.13 -0.02
Oklahoma, 3rd -0.14 -0.02
Texas, 19th -0.15 -0.02
Texas, 23rd -0.15 -0.02
Louisiana, 3rd -0.15 -0.04
Kentucky, 5th -0.16 -0.03
Bottom 10
District Real wage change, % Wage+tariff revenue, %
Ohio, 4th -0.41 -0.30
Georgia, 14th -0.40 -0.27
Ohio, 5th -0.40 -0.28
Indiana, 2nd -0.39 -0.28
Michigan, 10th -0.38 -0.26
Indiana, 3rd -0.38 -0.26
Michigan, 2nd -0.38 -0.26
Wisconsin, 6th -0.38 -0.26
Wisconsin, 8th -0.37 -0.26
Texas, 14th -0.37 -0.24
Average -0.27 -0.15
Median -0.27 -0.15
Standard deviation 0.05 0.05
Notes: This Table reports the real wage changes of the top 10 and bottom 10 US congressional districts with the
largest/smallest real wage changes.
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